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 Recently, sexual assault within the military community has been drawing the attention of 
the media, military leaders, politicians and every day citizens. Criminologists however have 
traditionally not addressed this crime, and have specifically not addressed sexual assault within 
the US Navy. This dissertation seeks to address the current gap in literature by examining the 
sociocultural workplace climate of the US military and its possible contribution to the occurrence 
of sexual assaults. Utilizing original data obtained by NCIS, regression models were ran to 
evaluate sexual assault victim and offender demographics. The surprising findings were then 
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brave women who fought for their right to fight for this country; to those who went where they 
were told they didn’t belong and did things they were told they could never do. And to those 
victims of military sexual assault, may this work bring you some peace of mind in knowing that 
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It is the intention of the project to be read by both criminologists and military personnel 
alike. And while my criminologist colleagues may understand my motivations, those members of 
the military not familiar with academia may not. That being said, I would like my intentions to 
be absolutely clear. Over the years my interest in crime within the military community has arisen 
not out of spite or negativity, but out of a genuine patriotic sentiment towards those who serve 
this nation. It is my sincere belief that the American military is essential to the survival of our 
nation and that the strength of that military comes from being able to be as efficient as possible. 
Crime and deviancy within the military community is a problem and it is one that is drawing 
resources away from the members of the military who are upstanding and patriotic individuals.  
In the last few years our government has allocated millions and millions of dollars to help 
solve many of the problems our military community is currently experiencing. Millions are being 
spent on understanding substance abuse, violent acts (shootings), gangs, fraud (both benefits and 
contracts), and sexual assault and general violence against women. At the same time, every year 
of late, our government has made the conscious decision to cut pay, benefits, supply budgets, 
leave time, and even 4th of July firework displays on bases, while at the same time demanding 
continued excellence, and at times even an impossible level of performance, from the greatest 
military force on earth.  
 I am not so naive as to interpret budgets so simply as to state that solving the 
crime/deviance problem within the military would place more money in the pockets of the 
hardworking military member, but I am willing to state that contributing to the understanding of 
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crime and deviance within the military improves the efficiency of that military and contributes to 
a return in focus to national security and away from scandals. If we as a nation can understand 
how these problems are happening within the military, perhaps we are then closer to more 
efficient solutions that can be put in place. Even if it only helps a small amount, social science 
has a very solid role in the military community and needs to be continued in order to help the 
military be as strong as it can be.  
 The crimes and deviant behavior discussed and analyzed within this dissertation are 
representative of a small percentage of the military community as a whole. This is not in any way 
an attempt to portray those that sacrifice more than their share to defend this country as criminals 
or deviants or as anything less than the upstanding Americans that they are.  






While the US military is predominantly made up of good, upstanding, hard-working 
Americans who simply want to serve their country and their communities, and provide for their 
families, there exists a few bad apples. Often times, crime and the US military are two topics that 
are never put together. As civilians, we like to consider our military men and women the best of 
the best our nation has to offer; those who wear the white hats while being the defenders of 
freedom and democracy. But the military community, just like any community, experiences 
crime, deviance, and disorder. Not convinced? Turn on any major news network and give it a 
little bit of time; eventually a story will be presented concerning military fraud, gangs, violent 
crime, substance abuse, or crimes involving violence against women and children. All of these 
topics are of themselves fascinating, but the current needs of the military dictate that the issue of 
violence against women within its ranks be addressed and understood as soon as possible.  
In early 2013, President Barak Obama, acting as commander in chief of all US Military 
branches hold a press conference in which he stated that he had ordered Defense Secretary 
Chuck Hagle to, “step up our game exponentially” to stop sexual assaults in the military 
(Steinhaur 2013). He made it very clear that the situation was unacceptable and that there would 
be accountability going forward for failures to adequately address the sex assault situation by the 
military leaders tasked with oversight. Why did the Commander and Chief of the United States 
Armed Forces have to make this decree via a very public press conference? Because the Armed 
Forces of the United States of America has a sexual assault problem; one that is so large that it is 
4 
	  
now making a regular appearance on the nightly news, and is indirectly impacting the efficiency 
of the military as a whole.   
Again, these facts are shocking because the members of the military are seen by civilian 
society as being held to a higher level of conduct, the “white hat” wearers. But this shouldn’t be 
shocking to criminologists, especially when we take into account Emile Durkheim’s (1938) 
perspective that crime is a natural occurrence within any society and Janowitz (1960) who says 
that historically, the military is a reflection of the civilian society it is drawn from and serves. 
What is shocking to this criminologist, is that the military community, which clearly has a crime 
problem, has received nearly no consideration from this field. If we as a field can’t get excited 
about this topic for purely academic reasons, then perhaps the financial bottom line will grab the 
attention of criminologists; after all, our research historically is directed to where the money is. 
In the year, 2012, the United States government allocated over $700 billion of a total 
$3.729 trillion budget for its Department of Defense (DoD) budget. It is a bigger number than 
most Americans can even conceptualize. Many would even have to stop and think about how 
many “billions” go into one trillion. Of that $700 billion, $154.2 billion is requested for the 
subcategory “military personnel,” but this does not represent the actual amount being spent of 
the military community. For a more accurate picture, and one that is decidedly more shocking in 
its scale, examining the budget requests from the individual branches themselves might be better:  
  ARMY  $244.9 billion 
  NAVY   $149.9 billion 
  AIR FORCE  $170.6 billion 
  MARINE CORPS $29.0 billion 
  
Clearly, that $154.2 billion “military personnel” request does not demonstrate the total amount 
being spent on America’s military. It is in fact, much more. To put it in perspective for 
criminologists, in that same year, 2012, the United States allocated $28.2 billion to the 
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Department of Justice (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2012). Since criminological 
research is largely driven by the allocation of grants for specific topics (i.e. drugs, gangs, 
juvenile delinquency, corrections, policing) a community such as the military community, 
commanding a budget this large, and clearly experiencing crime problems, should be grabbing 
the attention of criminologists everywhere.  
 The point of discussing the amount of money being spent on the military is not to stir up 
a discussion concerning the ever-present question of how the nation should be spending its 
money, or which cause is more worthy of a higher budget. An entire library’s shelves worth of 
writings could be created around that discussion, and is perhaps best left to the economists to sort 
out. The purpose of this discussion and bringing in the total military spending figures is to make 
the following argument: If the nation is willing to spend that much of tax payers’ money on the 
military, then the government needs to have a full and complete understanding of the community 
that it is spending that large amount of money on. This understanding does not simply include 
the ins-and-outs of waging and winning a war, but rather, for reasons to be discussed shortly, 
also includes, and would be grossly incomplete without, the sociological functioning of the 
group, deviant and criminal behaviors that do occur within it, and more pertinent to this 
discussion, violence against women in the form of sexual assault.  
In case the aforementioned figures don’t generate interest and motivation on the part of 
the military to adequately address its sexual assault problem, and criminologists to get involved 
with the understanding of that problem, there is one last figure worth mentioning; according to 
Faley et al. (1999), the total cost of sexual assaults for the US Army in 1988, over 20 years ago, 
was $250,000,000. According to a Service Women’s Action Network’s Quick Facts report on 
sexual assault in the military from 2012, in the year 2011 alone the military spent $10,880 
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treating each individual victim of military sexual trauma. That individual level cost, when 
multiplied by the number of military victims (that is, ignoring costs associated with treating 
civilians victimized by military personnel) leads to a grand total of $872,000,000 spent for 2011 
treating military victims of sex assault. It is also worth noting that in OIF/OEF, and in 
engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple reports have surfaced of troops being ill-
equipped with bottom dollar, sub-par weapons and equipment produced by the most inexpensive 
defense contractor company possible. If the military can’t get interested in this topic for purely 
altruistic reasons, perhaps they can see the logic in addressing it so that resources can be 
allocated to adequately outfitting those who are willing to risk their lives to defend this nation 
and her interests abroad. As demonstrated, the numbers speak for themselves.   
 Violence against women within the military community is becoming more and more of a 
concern of late. Over the last couple decades, the nightly news has been littered with stories of 
sexual assault and intimate partner violence; The Navy’s Tailhook scandal, the Air Force 
Academy’s sexual assaults, the Army’s Fort Leonard Wood and Aberdeen Proving Ground 
incidents and the Army wife murders at Fort Bragg, and more recently, the Naval Academy’s 
sexual assault scandal. These cases all have in common two things; female victims, and male 
perpetrators. The point of interest however is that while the victims are female, they are 
comprised of both military and civilian individuals. The male perpetrators however, are 
exclusively military.  
Despite the millions of dollars being poured into developing programs and training 
designed to prevent these types of crimes, something about the military community is fostering 
an environment that is conducive to the continuation of violence against women. The argument 
will be made in this dissertation that it is a pervasive hegemonic masculine conscious, 
7 
	  
manifested and fostered via the camaraderie and brotherhood that is the foundation of the social 
culture of the US military, which is directly linked to the instances of sexual assault that the 
military is currently experiencing.  
This study addresses violence against women via sexual assault within the military 
context, specifically within the US Navy community located in the Hampton Roads of Virginia 
area. It will first describe the current military culture in a sort of sociocultural approach that will 
act as a loose theoretical framework for how these crimes are occurring and why. As will be 
demonstrated, under this masculine hegemonic conscious women fall into a lower social class 
regardless of their official roles as soldier, sailor, wife, or mother and men become socialized to 
accept sexual violence. Second, all available relevant sexual assault literature will be discussed 
in order to better understand the military sexual assault problem. The sociocultural understanding 
of the military community and the sexual assault literature will then be discussed loosely within 
the frame of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory. Hypotheses concerning victim 
and offender characteristics will be developed based on this understanding of both military 
culture and established literature. Data from Naval Criminal Investigative Service concerning 
rapes, sexual/indecent assaults, simple assaults and domestic assaults will be analyzed in 
conjunction with the Department of the Navy’s Sexual Assault and Prevention Office in order to 
understand how extensive the problem is, and what specific victim and offender demographics 
are connected to these crimes. Lastly, findings will be reported and discussed in conjunction with 
possible suggestions for policy change and strategies for addressing these crimes going forward.   
It is the purpose of this project to contribute to the exploration of a somewhat 
misunderstood problem. To date, multiple agencies/sources have attempted to measure sexual 
assaults within the military only to have conflicting definitions of the crime as well as 
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measurements of it. Many of the official agencies responding to this crime are taking a triage 
approach and working simply with individual cases and crimes in more of an individual level, 
trial-and-error, “let’s just see what works” strategy. As of yet, an aggregate, sociocultural 
focused approach from a criminologist has yet to be seen. This project stands as an attempt to 
involve criminology in the military sexual assault discussion, and also to aid in the further 
exploration and understanding of it. Findings from this study could perhaps aid the military 




CHAPTER 3  
THE US MILITARY AND THE US NAVY: DEMOGRAPHICS, ORGANIZATION AND 
SOCIOLOGY RELEVANT TO SEXUAL ASSAULTS 
 
While most people can immediately call to mind an image to define the word, “military,” 
in the interest of science, it is necessary to have a working definition in order to have a 
meaningful and scientific discussion of sexual assaults within the military community going 
forward. Further, a full understanding of the target subject, the military, is necessary in order 
even begin to understand crime, and specifically, sexual assaults, within it as a community. 
Siebold (2001:140) defines the military as,  
a formally organized entity or set of entities responsive to the government leaders 
heading a nation state (or equivalent government) and whose functions concern 
the use of arms to defend that nation state or to further its policies in its relations 
with other nation states or large collective entities. 
 
Siebold (2001) goes on to include in this list all the branches of the military including the Coast 
Guard, as well as Reservist and National Guard components, international coalitions, and NATO. 
As many of our armed forces are working jointly in some sort of international effort whilst 
deployed, it is safe to assume then that for the purpose of study, all US military worldwide fall 
under the definition of U.S. military.  
 Aside from a working definition, a full understanding of the United States Military also 
rests heavily on an understanding of structure and organization. For this, a working paradigm is 
essential. Dunivin (1994) says that the dominating paradigm in the US military is combat 
masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm. The first part refers to the fact that the sole purpose of the 
military is to engage in, and win, any and all combat situation it is presented with. All structure, 
organization and cultural sentiments are centered on this one primary goal. The second part of 
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the paradigm is the masculine-warrior component. The military is, strictly speaking in a numbers 
sense, primarily dominated by men, and the act of waging war is often interpreted to be 
masculine. As such, the culture of this combat structured community is dominated by a 
masculine norms, values, and lifestyles.  
 Keeping with the first part of Dunivin’s (1994) paradigm for understanding the US 
military, the structure and organization of the US military makes complete sense. Individuals 
within the US military are given a rank (rate in the Navy). This rank allows for quick combat 
decisions to be made because without knowing anything about another individual, based simply 
on rank, the decisions of who will lead and who will follow have already been made. No time is 
wasted debating the merits of individuals; the higher rank makes the call, and the lower rank falls 
in line. This lead/follow hierarchy permeates all aspects of military life both officially (on the 
job) and socially (at home and with friends).  
 These ranks are essentially broken up into three broad categories; enlisted, non-
commissioned officer, and officer. Both enlisted and non-commissioned officers are considered 
enlisted personnel and represented by “E” and a number dictating their rank within that category. 
Officers are designated “O” and a number in exactly the same fashion. These “E-#” and “O-#” 
designations are how the government sets regulations for its personnel; everything from pay-
scales to privileges is done by these “E” and “O” rank indicators. In fact, these “E” and “O” rank 
indicators are simply referred to as pay scales.  
 According to Schading, Shading and Slayton (2007) Enlisted (E) personnel make up the 
majority of the military, are generally younger, may have some college credits or perhaps even 
two-year associates degrees, and are perhaps looking for advanced technical training of some 
sort. Shading et al. (2007) say specifically that E-1 to E-4 (E-3 in the Navy and Marines) 
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personnel are often times just leaving home for the first time and are simply looking for travel or 
an adventure, or a life starting option other than traditional four-year college/university options. 
The next group, E-5 to E-9 (E-4 in Navy and Marines) represent the non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) and they are responsible for, “direct tactical leadership in combat units, technical skills, 
and direction in support commands” (Shading et al. 2007:6). NCOs are typically older than the 
E-1 to E-3/4 group because they have served longer. They are also more educated; all must have 
graduated from high school or have a GED equivalent, and most have two year degrees or other 
advanced training/certifications from the branch they serve in. Some have four-year college 
degrees, but it is rare and often times this is seen in the Special Warfare and Special Forces 
communities for reasons not relevant to this discussion.  
 Commissioned officers (O) are different than enlisted personnel for a few reasons. They 
carry more responsibility than any enlisted individual. With advancement up the officer ranks 
comes more and more responsibility. Their commission according to Schading et al. (2007) as an 
officer is given directly by the President of the United States and their rank and advancement is 
confirmed by the US Senate. All officers must have a four-year degree from an accredited 
college or university and may be commissioned in one of three ways; they went to one of the 
service academies, they were in their school’s ROTC program, or they attended officer candidate 
school after graduation.  
 In terms of demographics, the branches are relatively similar. The Army for instance is 
comprised of 561,437 total active personnel; 97,551 of which are officers (of those 15,760 are 
female and 26,895 identify as a racial minority) and 463,886 are enlisted (of which, 60,255 are 
female and 145,628 identify as a racial minority) (Department of Defense 2011). The Navy 
however is comprised of 320,141 total active personnel; 53,209 of which are officers (of those, 
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8,520 are female and 10, 288 identify as a racial minority) and 266,932 are enlisted (of those 
43,896 are female and 112,895 identify as a racial minority) (Department of Defense 2011). 
More detailed demographics of the Navy are interesting and relevant to an understanding 
of crime within it, specifically, these demographics help to understand the environment in which 
violence against women is occurring. As mentioned, there are a total of 320,141 active duty 
Naval personnel. Roughly 9% (or 29,433) have a four-year college degree, 65% (207,566) are 
under the age of 30, 54% (171,331) are married, and 41% (132,714) have children. Of those 
Navy personnel with children, 52% of men were under the age of 25 when they had their first 
child, and 70% of women were under the age of 25 when they had their first child (Department 
of Defense 2011).  
The Navy’s two largest base areas globally are San Diego, California and the Hampton 
Roads area of Virginia. As such, it could be reasonable to expect similar demographic displays in 
these two areas as we would see for the Navy at large due to the large concentration of Naval 
personnel in these areas. The Navy in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia is spread out over 
multiple bases stretching through parts of Norfolk and Virginia Beach; Naval Station Norfolk, 
Naval Shipyard Norfolk, Little Creek, Oceana Air Base, Dam Neck, and Naval Medical Center 
Portsmouth among others. For these bases and surrounding areas, it would be reasonable to 
expect to find a similar low percentage of individual with degrees, and disproportionately high 
numbers of individuals that are young, male, married, and have children (that they had when they 







Bryant (1979) in his book Khaki Collar Crime presents both a typology of crime within 
the military as well as his list of seven facilitators, or conditions specific to the military 
community and allow for crime to happen within it. A few of these facilitators are relevant to the 
discussion on sexual assaults. He says that the first facilitator of crime in the military is the 
population demographics of the military itself. Compared to the rest of American society, the 
military is disproportionately comprised of younger, predominantly male, lower-educated 
individuals who are also at the lower end of the income spectrum (See also for example Graves 
and Graves and Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercier 2000). According to the 
above numbers presented by the Department of Defense itself, Bryant and many military 
sociologist/criminologists are correct about the age, gender, and education demographics of the 
US military.  
The connection between crime and lower-incomes within the military is relevant. 
According to the Department of Defense (2011) enlisted personnel in the pay grades of E-1 to E-
4 were set to earn $18,000 and $26,000 for the 2012 fiscal year. While the military may provide 
a steady paycheck, Mercer (2000:5) says, “37 percent, of the lowest pay grades of E-1 to E-4 are 
composed of soldiers 30-years old and younger who are married.” The DoD (2011) also states 
that military spouses under the age of 30 make up 29.2% of all military spouses. Further adding 
to the financial burden placed on military members within this rang of pay grades are two key 
facts; one, 39% of military spouses are classified as “not in labor force [i.e. not looking]” (The 
DoD reports that this number jumps to 45% when a spousal self-report measure is used.) and 
two, 44.2% of service members within the E-1 to E-4 range have dependents (children) under the 
age of 18.   
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The connection that these demographic categories have to crime has been long 
documented by criminologists. It is widely accepted that younger individuals commit more 
crimes (see for example Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Farrington 1986; Rowe and Tittle 1977; 
Hindelang 1981) and therefore, having disproportionately high level of younger individuals in a 
group would facilitate crime. The connection between crime and age within a military setting has 
long been cited as a facilitator of crime (see for example Caliber Associates 1996; Graves and 
Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercer 2000). The relationship between gender 
and crime has also long been documented by criminologists with the understanding being that 
males commit more crimes than females, or as Lauritson et al. (2009:362) called it, “one of the 
few undisputed ‘facts’ of criminology.” Naturally then, the relationship between gender and 
crime within a military setting has also been pointed to as a facilitator. (see for example Caliber 
Associates 1996; Graves and Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercer 2000). This 
gender-crime connection is relevant to a discussion of the issue of sexual assault within the 
military community as well and will be further expanded on within this chapter and the 
proceeding chapters.    
Criminologists have addressed the education and crime connection and generally agree 
that higher education is tied to lower crime rates. While education level and crime within a 
military setting isn’t as well developed as the age/crime and gender/crime relationships, it has 
still received some attention and, along with gender and age is cited widely cited as a facilitator 
of crime within the military. Steveson (1990) in a study concerning the officer-enlisted 
distinction and organizational reactions to deviance over time found that the drastically increased 
amount of troops with degrees during Vietnam was directly tied to the amount of bad paper 
discharges (BPD…aka dishonorable discharge). This further proves that the role of the 
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education/crime connection within the military is of particular importance because of the social 
structure implications that education carries with it within the military that are not the same as 
civilian society. 
 
Motivation for Joining 
Understanding the motivations of the participants within a group may lay the foundation 
for understanding motivations to commit crimes or engage in deviant behavior. And while 
criminologists have traditionally ignored crime within the military, sociologists have been 
attempting to understand the military and deviant behavior within it for the last fifty plus years. 
Ignoring the sociological “mapping” of the military that has occurred previously in any of 
criminology’s future attempts at understanding crime and deviance within the military would be 
an irresponsible ignoring of the science that has already been developed. In order for 
criminology to move forward into the uncharted territory that is crimes within the military, we 
must first acknowledge the established sociological understandings of the military to date. 
 As a means of understanding the behaviors of an individual within a group, motivations 
for joining the group is a logical starting place. Criminologists have used motive for joining as a 
starting place for understanding gangs and prisons. A number of sociologists have attempted to 
establish a basic theoretical understanding of why individuals decide to participate in the 
military, and have arrived at a basic joining-motive question, is the military occupational or 
institutional? (see for example Janowitz 1971, 1977; Moskos, 1973, 1977, 1986, 1988; Moskos 
and Wood, 1988; Shields, 1993, Sorensen, 1994.) Generally speaking, an institutional military 
would be one in which the participants are drawn together because of a unifying ethos of 
patriotism and/or service to one’s nation. An occupational military by contrast would be one 
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where the participants are driven by an economic or career incentive/goal. A dominating 
sentiment in this regard going forward from WWII is that, “military service is changing from a 
calling or vocation, legitimized by institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized by the labor 
market” (Moskos 1977; Segal & Segal 1983:161).  
 Both of these classifications could be the basis for understanding the individual’s mindset 
when deciding to engage in criminal/deviant behavior. An individual who views the military as 
an occupational community is strongly motivated by money or career prestige. Under this model, 
such problem behaviors, or what Bryant (1979) would classify as Intra-occupational crimes 
against property, such as misuse of funds or government property could be expected. Individuals 
in a position of managing budgets, ordering materials, or those who find themselves being loaned 
cars or jets because of their rank/job could fraudulently take advantage of their position. They 
could also be susceptible to bribing or payoffs. By contrast, under and institutional model, 
individuals are motivated by a unifying patriotic sentiment or call to service of one’s nation. 
Potential dalliances into criminal or deviant behavior by the individual who sees the military in 
this sense could include hazing, cover-ups (of failures or damaging information), or failure to 
speak up in situations that would demand it for fear of damaging reputation of the military or its 
ability to act effectively; essentially, all crimes/deviant behavior examples that are enacted in 
attempts to maintain cultural/group standards/safety/security.   
 
Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure is a second sociological approach to understanding the behaviors 
of the individuals within a group. One such approach relevant to a criminological study on the 
military involve the Durkheim (1949) concept of rationalization of the societies. Segal and Segal 
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(1983) argue that Durkheim’s idea on goals evolving from collective-based to individual-based 
as the society goes from simple (pre-industrial) to complex (post-industrial) is applicable to 
military sociology in that the effectiveness of military groups is increased when the goals are 
more collective and less individualistic, as is the case with smaller military units.  As we go 
away from these small military groups, into the much larger, much more formal “big” military, 
the goals switch from that of the group to that of the individual. Criminologists could expand on 
this as a means of understanding motivations and possibly theorizing crimes in this setting. 
Crimes within the more formal military would be more of the individual-goal type and would 
include abuses of power/position (i.e. sexual harassment, bribery, insider trading, etc.) and 
misuses of government property. We would expect to see more group-goal type crimes within 
small groups similar to what we would see with street and/or juvenile gangs (i.e. hazing, 
individual level violence between members on the unit, substance abuse related to performance 
stressors, etc.) As with the institutional model mentioned above, crimes/deviance directed 
towards maintaining the norms of the group (hazing, failure to report crimes, etc.) would happen 
at the smaller group/unit level.  
 
Military Socialization  
An individual might be able to trace a history of military service back for generations, 
and that individual might possess all the patriotic sentiment possible, but members of the US 
military are not born, they are made. It starts with a decision to join, but the process of “making” 
a soldier/Sailor/Marine is one of socialization, that is, the process by which an individual makes 
the transition from civilian to military. Bryant (1979:55) states that, “the socialization process 
must be extraordinarily intense, totally comprehensive, and effectively convert the civilian into a 
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noncivilian in terms of values, beliefs, and perspectives, as well as behavior.” Vest (2013:603) in 
a study of Army National Guardsmen highlighted these differences saying that, “civilian society 
values atomization, pursuit of comfort, freedom of choice, equality, and readiness for discussion 
and compromise, military culture emphasizes the contradictory values of unity, endurance, 
obedience, hierarchy, and readiness for violence.” Because life within the service is so different 
than civilian life, there exists, a necessity to unify all incoming members of the military under a 
common sentiment. This sentiment is the result of many individual acts of socialization including 
basic training and hazing. 
 It is the most basic function of basic training to instill in future service members the 
necessary skills to survive, and be successful in, combat situations. This training process has a 
latent effect however, the bonding of future military personnel through a shared unpleasant 
experience. The effect of this unpleasant training experience and the bond to the group that it 
facilitates is addressed by Lyon (1969:223) who interprets the process in the following way; “In 
order to justify to himself the severe initiation of recruit training, the Marine recruit has to assign 
high value to the group joined (or devalue the harshness of training.)” As today’s military force 
is entirely volunteer, the harshness of the training process is justified in the mind of the 
individual by the high value/prestige he places on membership within the group. There is a 
willingness to override any opposition thinking within one’s own mind, and accept the negative 
and counterintuitive situation before them, in order to become part of the group they have placed 
value upon.  
 The unpleasantness of basic training is not arbitrary bullying, it is completely deliberate 
and serves a purpose. Military sociologists have long pointed to it as the quickest and more 
efficient way to bond together members of the military at both, what Siebold (2007) calls the 
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primary (peer and leader bonding) level and secondary (organizational and institutional) level. In 
fact, military sociologists agree on the necessity of this experience as being personally degrading 
and acting as a sort of shock treatment or a personal crisis in order to solidify the bonds of the 
group (see for example Brotz and Wilson 1946; Bryant 1979; Janis 1945; Stouffer 1949; Zurcher 
1967). The bonds that are forged in basic training are reinforced within combat units as the 
soldier/Sailor/Marine continues throughout their military career. According to Siebold 
(2007:287) however, the simplified primary and secondary level bonding is actually a more 
complex model of military group cohesion consisting of four parts; peer bonding (horizontal), 
leader (vertical), organizational, and institutional. While the peer to peer bond and the peer to 
leader bond may be a bit self-explanatory, he explains that the individual service person also has 
a bond to their next higher organization, what he appropriately calls organizational bonding (i.e. 
squadron and air wing) and to their individual branch, institutional bonding, (i.e. Navy, Army, 
etc.).  
 All of these various bonds that have been described operate simultaneously throughout 
the service member’s career and the group cohesion model is itself useful for understanding how 
crime/deviancy occur within the military. Many of the socialization processes that the military 
sociologists have identified have a hazing feel to them as criminologists would interpret it. 
Hazing and the role that it plays in the military is vital to the bonds mentioned above, but also 
acts as a starting point for understanding how crime/deviance is allowed to occur and go 
unanswered within the military. Dornbush (1955) and Park and Burgess (1921:735) address the 
role of hazing at military academies by referring to the socialization process (or as he calls it, 
assimilation) by saying that, “assimilation is a process in which persons and groups acquire the 
sentiment, memories, and attitudes of other persons/groups and by sharing their experience and 
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history, are incorporated with them in common cultural life.” This could not be truer of the 
military. Essentially, the shared unpleasant history/experiences of the group leads to a future 
commitment to the shared culture and history of the group which leads to a dedication on the part 
of the group to a replication of those unpleasant experiences for a new people trying to join the 
group. 
 This mapping of the group cohesion and an understanding of the bonds and the role that 
socialization/assimilation and hazing play in forging them, allows for the military criminologist 
to begin to understand how crimes/deviancy can be allowed to occur. Specifically, it paints the 
picture of how violence against women is allowed to occur within this community. Women 
trying to join the military may not be a new concept, and women being married to, and 
subsequently abused by, their service member husbands is definitely not a new concept, 
something about how these bonds within the military community are playing out is leading to an 
acceptance of sexual assault and spousal abuse. Simply put, the need to preserve tradition and 
group cohesion is being placed first on the list of behavior dictates and leads to an acceptance of 
these crimes on the part of the individual even when “big” military, the civilian world, and the 
individual’s own conscience is condemning them loudly.  
 
Military Workplace Culture  
 The military workplace culture takes over after the various socialization processes are 
complete and provides the daily maintenance that is necessary to solidify the values and 
traditions that were instilled.  Military workplace culture is ever present and is a daily reminder 
of why the individual does what they do, how they should go about doing it, and that they are not 
alone, but rather part of a devoted brotherhood. According to Bryant (1979:49) workplace 
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culture is another of the seven facilitators of crime and, develops as a way of the individual 
coping with problems associated with working the job on a daily basis and, “it provides reasons 
and rationalizations for certain types of work-related behaviors as well as clarifying, obscuring, 
or modifying their perspective of social control and sanctions.”  
Much of this workplace culture centers on the profession of arms paradigm. The 
profession of arms in the United States is unique to any other profession in this country in that it, 
according to Huntington (1957), encompasses the following components not found in this 
specific combination in any other job; service to the state, deep loyalty, and expertise in the 
application and management of violence. The profession also carries with it a deep set feeling of 
independence from the civilian society it is sworn to serve; 
Military professionals, Huntington observed, tended to view war as inherent in 
human nature and, therefore, favored the maintenance of a strong, diverse, and 
ready military force. Justifying war as an instrument of politics, they often 
perceived international law and organizations of little help to global peace and, 
given their specialized professional expertise, only hesitantly accepted civilian 
control over the armed forces. (Franke 2001:95; Huntington 1957)  
 
Furthermore, those individuals who chose a career within the profession of arms possess 
different value systems than their civilian counterparts. In a study of value comparison between 
cadets in the US Military Academy at West Point and their civilian counterparts at Syracuse 
University, Franke (2001:113-4) found that the cadets, “tended to be more conservative, patriotic 
and warrioristic. . .and indicate that the next generation of military officers still adheres to 
traditional military values. . .By their freshman year, cadets already differed significantly in their 






Military Workplace Cultural Model  
The military culture has essentially split into two main parts that appear to be addressed 
only as one by most military sociologists; formal military workplace culture, FMWC (the culture 
that big military advocates), and informal social military workplace culture, IMWC (the culture 
that the individual members of the military advocate/participate in). Each of these two factions of 
military workplace culture split likewise into two parts; manifest cultural image and latent 
cultural image. The manifest cultural aspect of the FMWC would be the part that advocates a 
view that the military should be reflective of the society it serves and representative of its 
population. Dorn (1990:115) and Dunivin (1994:538) sum up this sentiment stating that, “there 
appears to be a consensus in the United States that the armed forces should be a reflection of the 
society,” essentially it should, “mirror society’s social demographic makeup (regional, economic, 
racial, ethnic and gender diversity) as well as its core values (e.g. equality and civil rights). . 
.excluding whole groups of ‘others’ (e.g women) from combat diminishes the pool of talent 
available for our nation’s defense.” This manifest culture of the FMWC is enforced via the 
passage of equality legislation within the military, the construction of equal representation 
recruitment ads, and the publicly projected stance of intolerance of all things counter to this 
equality sentiment (i.e. the Obama press conference on sexual assaults last year). The latent 
culture of the FMWC however is still very much alive and well, via the dominant combat warrior 
paradigm, and it effectively counters the manifest culture. This is achieved, according to Dunivin 
(1994:537) by individual branch slogans (i.e. the Marine’s “Every Man a Rifleman” slogan), 
inscriptions on buildings at the service academies (i.e. the Airforce Academy “Bring Me Men”), 
or even more disturbingly, the rampant hushed sexual assault cover-ups by individual 
commanding officers as depicted in the documentary The Invisible War.  
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 The informal military workplace culture, IMWC, refers to the individual level culture. It 
is more present in the lives of the individual service personnel and has a larger impact on daily 
behavior than the FMWC. It too is split into manifest and latent cultures. The manifest IMWC 
refers to the more public everyday workplace cultural conditions that while not entirely public in 
the sense that the civilian world would know of them, are public in the sense that anyone within 
the military might be aware of them and could participate without restriction. Examples would 
include but are definitely not limited to displaying unit/squadron patches/colors/emblems/coins, 
unit BBQs/Picnics/deployment parties, charity/cause centered outings and specific unit/group 
facebook pages or other social media pages for the members of the group to post on. These all 
serve as outwardly unifying symbols of one’s belonging to the group and a reinforcement of the 
values of that group. All members of the group are invited to participate without hesitation or 
exclusion. It would be the equivalent of a civilian deciding to host a back yard BBQ for everyone 
at the office, or inviting the whole office to participate in a bowling league complete with 












Figure 1.1-Squadron Patch 
 
 
The latent cultural elements of the IMWC however, just as was seen with the latent 
cultural elements of the FMWC, take on a more negative theme. The latent cultural elements of 
the FMWC take on destructive, exclusive, closed-door, secretive feel but are still given full 
credibility and acceptance by the individual service members. These would include but again are 
definitely not limited to, gossip websites and deliberate scandals within the group, cliques, wives 
clubs, negative hazing and military group/job social media pages promoting inequality, anti-
women sentiments and celebrating combat violence and enemy death. The ideas and sentiments 
expressed in these type of latent cultural elements may be unifying in nature, in that they contain 
ideas and sentiments that any member of the community can immediately recognize and identify 
with, there is an exclusive, bullying and potentially harassing theme to them. Civilians, and even 
former military not currently following military social media may not recognize the “humor” in 
the following two examples of latent cultural elements of the IMWC, but anyone affiliated with 












Established Tradition and Masculine Hegemonic Conscience 
 Much of the unifying culture in the United States Military community revolves around 
the traditional masculine role. It is a somewhat logical situation; in the 230 plus years that the US 
military has been in existence, women were only allowed into its service academies in the early 
1970’s and combat situations in the 1990’s. The ability to perform one’s job as a 
soldier/Sailor/Marine has always been linked to one’s masculinity and weeding out that 
mentality has proven difficult over time. Scarce (1997:47) states that, in the military, “men’s 
gender roles become more rigid and narrow, heavily scrutinized for any behavior that might 
seem the slightest bit feminine, and therefore, considered weak and unfit for military service.”  
Taking into account then the fact that everything in the military from uniforms, to social 
engagements (i.e. balls), to combat accommodations, to daily language and terms is inherently 
male, the stalled attempts to integrate femininity should not be entirely shocking.  
 America in general, and American military specifically, has a long tradition of hegemonic 
masculinity. The term itself stems from Antonio Gramci’s ideas on how different class groups 
relate to each other, establish a hierarchy of power, and maintain one’s position within the group 
that dominates. Hegemonic masculinity then, according to, Barrett (1996:130) “refers to a 
particular idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other 
masculinities are marginalized and subordinated.”  Currently in the Western world, hegemonic 
masculinity encompasses characteristics such as independence, risk-taking, aggression, 
heterosexuality, and rational decision making (Connell 1995). Men who possess these traits are 
regarded as strong or proper men, men who do not possess these traits but aspire to acquire them 
are seen as normal, men who neither possess, nor aspire to possess, these traits are regarded as 
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feminine; which for a man in Western culture, particularly in a Western world military culture, 
would be in insult.   
These hegemonic masculine ideals dominate all aspects of life in America from work to 
home, advertising and entertainment, sports and especially, national defense. According to Arkin 
and Dobrofsky (1978:167), “the military has socialized millions of men according to some 
traditional blueprint. . . as such, the dominant adult male role [in America] could largely be the 
product of the military,” and vice versa due to the previously discussed military-as-a-reflection-
of-the-society-it-serves connection. “Militaries around the world have defined the soldier as an 
embodiment of traditional male sex role behaviors. From recruiting posters that seek ‘a few good 
men’ to popular media images of John Wayne fearlessly leading the troops in a WWII battle, 
Tom Cruise as a ‘top gun’ pilot,” Will Smith as a Marine fighter pilot who saves the world from 
alien invasion in Independence Day, to Mark Wahlberg as Lone Survivor Marcus Luttrell, the 
cultural overlap between soldier/warrior and masculine American is overwhelming (Barrett 
1996:129).  
 This role of masculinity within the military is so strong that it is often times the basis for 
controlling behaviors. When the Marine Corps decided to address spousal abuse, Lt. Gen. Jack 
W. Klimp, the Marine Corps' deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs had the 
following to say,   
‘You're a Marine 24 hours a day. You're not just a Marine in the field. You're 
expected to conduct yourself like a Marine all the time.' Domestic violence is not 
Marine-like. It's not soldier-like. It's not Sailor-like. It's not airman-like. We need 
to ensure that every Marine, soldier, Sailor and airman in the Department of 





The implication here is that there is a gentlemanly element to the warrior paradigm, and that 
anything concerning violent or warrioristic behaviors towards innocents/civilians, which spouses 
and children would fall under, is un-gentlemanly, and in essence, not fit for duty in the military. 
The element of shaming is being used here to control the behaviors of the individual via the 
bonds they have with their peers, and the community’s unwavering commitment to all things 
manly.  
 This sentiment is reinforced every time a commander addresses a room of personnel he 
commands, “attention gentlemen!” “look alive gents!” and the tie between manliness and 
American gentlemanliness and military service is subconsciously reinforced. The expectation is 
that not only does the individual need to be manly in order to be effective in the military 
workplace, but they also need to possess elements of the traditional American concept of the 
sophisticated and chivalrous gentleman. This concept is inherently anti-female. Instead of 
condemning undesirable behavior (say rape for example) as simply inexcusable because no 
decent human being would engage in it, the approach is to label it unmanly and therefore 
unacceptable because it lowers the level of one’s manliness/readiness for war, not one’s 
humanity. Conversely, in the instances within the military where sexual assault occurs, it could 
be possible that the masculine cultural image has morphed into one that is accepting of violence 
against women.  
 Flawed as this approach may be, tying a military member’s manliness and ability to 
perform their duties to their behavior is an effective means of control. Why then, is it not 
working? A significant portion of this answer rests in the myth of the scorned gentleman soldier; 
the chivalrous warrior wronged by the woman he has entrusted with his heart, his children and 
his possessions while he is away defending freedom. Scholars have not really addressed this 
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myth and role that it plays within the military community with regard to fostering anti-female 
sentiment and contributing to an environment that could potentially allow for violence against 
women, but spend any bit of time within the military community, and it becomes very clear very 
quickly that this is a very dominant theme. It appears that at any point in time, any unit/group has 
at least one brother who is nursing a broken heart while another is navigating an ugly divorce. 
Stories of infidelity and frivolous spending of deployment pay by the spouse who is left back in 
the US run rampant, and any new military member will recall that one of the first pieces of 
advice they are given by colleagues who have been in longer is first, do not get married and 
second, never allow your spouse to sign a power of attorney.  
The myth of the cold hearted military spouse who does a soldier wrong has become so 
strong that it actually has a term within the community, dependapotamus. Various military social 
media/blog spots have addressed this myth and this term and a few have even defined it. 
Probably the most offensive example of a definition comes from a March 2014 posting on 
www.oafnation.com which stated the following,  
Dependapotamus: (noun) A shallow, heartless land mammal; preys upon enlisted 
military males; its natural habitat: the bars and nightclubs near military bases; its 
diet: government benefits, vodka and Doritos; its preferred transportation is a 
convertible adorned with military support stickers; its predominant predatory 
tactic is pre-emptive pregnancy and possessing your 1stSgt’s digits on speed dial. 
 
Roughly translated, we can ascertain that a dependapotamus is a woman who has intentionally 
gotten involved with a military member for the purposes of gaining access to his 
pay/benefits/military housing so that she might not have to work or support herself. Further, the 
myth holds that she accomplishes this by either purposely getting pregnant and forcing a 
marriage (spousal benefits) or by threatening to file a complaint with the military member’s 
supervisor. This myth of the dependapotamus is not unique to this one social site. The definition 
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may vary slightly, from site to site, but the interpretation is the same (see for example; 
www.oafnation.com, 2014; www.urbandictionary.com, 2008; terminallance.com, 2010; 














Figure 1.5-Dependapotamus Cartoon 
 
 
While military sociologists and criminologists have not really addressed the gender myth-
military sexual assault connection, many other scholars have developed the gender myth sub-
discipline and their findings may be helpful for an understanding of how this plays out in the 
military community. Howard (1984:270) in her study on gender stereotypes and reactions to 
victims found that, “when women are victimized in a manner consistent with crime stereotypes, 
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or ‘normal’ crimes, they may be especially likely to incur blame and to be derogated in accord 
with gender stereotypes.” This finding is important and relevant to this discussion because it can 
be expanded to fit the military community’s problem with sexual assaults in that it acknowledges 
that the community’s beliefs towards both the crime and the victim are relevant in understanding 
whether or not the community will tolerate the crime. If there is a dominating way of thinking 
within a community that sees women as desperate, opportunistic, and disloyal individuals 
consistent with the dependapotamus myth, then sexual violence towards women shouldn’t be 
entirely surprising. In fact, later in this dissertation, regression models will be conducted in order 
to test the strength of the relationship between sexual assault victimization and gender with the 















Figure 1.6-Skittles Trade 
 
 
Military Workplace Culture and Hypermasculinity 
With all these well-established masculine themes and traditions within the military, it 
should come as no surprise that integrating women into the armed forces has been met with 
difficulties, to say the least. A huge part of the myth of the gentleman soldier is based on the 
concept that soldiering was exclusively a male enterprise; women simply did not belong. Initial 
arguments against integrating women into the services revolved around this extremely vague and 
underdeveloped argument. Put more specifically, “male bonding is the cornerstone of small unit 
cohesion, and that the presence of women undermines this bonding, thus decreasing cohesion, 
and ultimately, readiness” (Savage and Gabriel, 1976:349). The exclusion of women in the 
armed forces is not simply an American concept, it is global:  
In some countries, women are excluded or have limited involvement, as in 
Germany, Italy and Spain. In others all or almost all military positions, (including 
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those with direct, offensive combat functions) are open to them, as in Canada, the 
Netherlands, Norway and more recently, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Notable examples among non-NATO nations are Israel, which 
concripts women but excludes them from combat operations, and Australia, which 
has recently opened fighter pilot positions and subMarines to women. (Dandeker 
and Segal 1996:29-30) 
  
 Dandecker and Segal (1996; Segal 1995) suggest that the role that women play in the 
military is determined primarily by the following; various military variables (such as war/peace 
time, the combat to support ratio, and promotion polices), characteristics of the social structure 
(demographic patterns, women’s role in the labor force, economic conditions), and cultural 
conditions/social construction of gender roles within the society. This women don’t belong 
sentiment is echoed by Iskra (2007) who says that even in the national emergency situation that 
was World War II, women were allowed to work only the jobs that were considered socially 
acceptable; office clerks, typists, telephone operators, and nurses.  
It appears however that this old school argument is on the outs for the most part. In her 
content analysis examining current sentiment of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in 
regards to women at sea, Iskra (2007) encountered results that were counter to this old school 
mentality. While both pro and anti-female integration sentiments were expressed, the anti-group 
was in the minority. The anti-integration group’s argument revolved around those old 
stereotypes; “women are caregivers not warriors,” and “women make babies, not war.” The pro-
integration folks however cited themes of American patriotism and equality as the basis of their 
arguments. These themes of patriotism and equality appear to also be the official sentiment of the 
Navy in regards to the role of women in their ranks as well. Scott Benning, program analyst at 
the Department of the Navy’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (DoN SAPRO) at 
the Pentagon stated that the issue of women in all areas of service is not a question of belonging; 
it is the question of having the best possible person for the job filling the role in order to achieve 
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the goal; discrimination on the basis of gender weakens the effort. Simply put, the overriding 
argument for the longest time against allowing women to serve appears to have been backed 
foremost by the social construction of gender roles. By the time women were allowed into 
combat situations, it was not the society catching up with the military, but rather, the military 
catching up with the conditions of American society. 
 
Figure 1.7-Equality  
 
 
If the integration of women into the armed forces is no longer an issue, and is accepted by 
the majority of service personnel, then how is it that the sexual assault problem is continuing on? 
There appears to be a collision of three community elements; the minority who believe women 
do not belong, the dominant hypermasculine culture, and the opportunity to act on these beliefs. 
The collision of these three parts will be discussed further in chapter 3, but the hyper masculine 
culture is a sociological concept that requires attention here. Military sociologists have suggested 
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that hypermasculinity appears to be directly related to the sexual assaults that the military 
community is currently experiencing due to either connections between hypermasculinity and 
acceptance of rape (both in military and civilian situations), military communities and their 
fostering of hypermasculinity, or some combination of both (see for example, Begany and 
Milburn, 2002; Gruber, 1997; Ilies et al., 2003; Malamuth, 1988; Malamuth and Brown, 1994; 
Mosher and Anderson, 1986, Quackenbush, 1989; Vogt et al., 2007). 
“Hypermasculinity is an extreme form of masculinity based on beliefs of polarized 
gender roles, the endorsement of stereotypical gender roles, a high value placed on control, 
power and competition, toleration of pain and mandatory heterosexuality” (Turchik and Wilson 
2010:271; Hunter 2007) This hypermasculinity is the direct result of the implementation of an 
instutionalized aggression approach on the part of the US military. The military’s sole purpose is 
to win any and all combat situations it finds itself involved in. In achieving this goal, there is a 
certain mindset that the individual has to take on in order to perform at the level necessary to 
achieve the goal. This mindset is introduced to the individual, and fostered throughout the 
individual’s career by the institutional nature of the military. And as Koeszegi et al. (2014:230; 
Kovitz 2003) see it, “institutionalized aggression cannot be understood without a gendered 
approach, as images of masculinity and femininity are central for their social organization and 
the inherence of aggression: Violence and warfare have been constructed as essentially male, 
whereas femininity is equaled with weakness and peace.” 
How does this hegemonic hypermasculinity play out with regard to women filling the 
ranks? In an extensive survey study conducted by RAND researchers examining the effect that 
integrating women into the military has on overall readiness, cohesion, and morale Harrell and 
Miller (1997) found that the military personnel surveyed did not feel that gender had an effect at 
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all on overall readiness, cohesion (unless the group was already experiencing conflict or 
cohesion issues), or overall moral levels. The researchers found that some things did negatively 
affect the relationship between gender and readiness, cohesion and moral levels including 
age/rank of the respondent, whether they were newly integrated units, whether there was 
preexisting upset within the units, and satisfaction levels with one’s job, but the researcher’s felt 
that gender could not be conclusively linked to the problem.  
Koeszegi et al. (2014) also attempted to answer the above question by testing six 
different hypotheses concerning the role of aggression in support units and combat units and the 
experiences of this aggression by gender, as well as gender difference with regard to traditional 
military roles and the role of women within the military. They had many interesting findings, but 
most relevant to this discussion would be that while the majority of members of support units 
feel that women are effective as members of the military, the majority of members of combat 
units disagree and feel that their presence is detrimental to group performance. Further, 
aggression experienced by women in these units was higher and was interpreted by the authors to 
be the result of the need of male members of the unit to weed out the women, to solidify bonds 
between the male members of the unit, and to continue the hegemonic hypermasculine culture.  
If aggression and bullying is the method used to ostracize women in combat units, it is 
not a stretch to see how bullying and aggression gets extended to sexual violence, or at the least, 
contributes to an environment that accepts it as a means of solidifying the brotherhood necessary 
to be successful in combat situations. “This sociocultural approach places rape on a continuum of 
sexually assaultive behaviors without defining rape as a deviant act committed by atypical 
individuals” (Berkowitz 1992:176; Margolin et al. 1989). It appears that sexual violence is 
almost acting as a way of forcing women out of the group. In a 2014 OAFnation.com post 
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entitled, “Women in the Infantry: A Common Sense Analysis,” an anonymous member of the 
military or contracting community going by the alias “Nocer” lays out his arguments for keeping 
women out of combat units citing physical inferiority, destruction of the warrior 
mentality/brotherhood, and the threat of sexual activity, both consensual and non-consensual, 
within the unit.  Specifically, “Nocer” says the following in regards to the effect on the 
brotherhood and unit efficiency,  
So what happens to these men who are living at the basest levels of human 
existence and instinct, when you insert a woman into the fold?. . . Is it realistic to 
expect them to live and die by their animal instincts, but completely turn off the 
most powerful instinct that human beings possess?  When all the men in a unit are 
sex deprived they can turn that aggression and frustration towards more 
productive things like killing. . . Now what happens if one or two men in a 
platoon are in a sexual relationship with the women in the 
platoon? Jealousy? Anger? Envy? Spite? What does that do to the fabric of that 
platoon? What does it do to the brotherhood? Infantrymen are about as alpha as 
men get.  They love to kill and they love women.  When as a whole, a group of 
men like this is saying that they want to spend years at a time with no women, 
they’re saying it for a reason. (www.OAFnation.com, 2014) 
 
While many of the comments on this social media page attacked the author’s arguments, 
or took issue with specific parts of it, one anonymous commenter going by the alias “Casey” had 
the following to say, “…if you put a dude and a girl on post together, he's not watching his 
sector, he's thinking about getting some pussy. In addition, throwing even a half decent piece of 
ass in the middle of a downrange platoon comprised of type A personalities is tantamount to 
throwing a t-bone steak in the middle of a group of pit bulls.” The implication here with both of 
these examples is that if a woman dares to step into a hypermasculine military environment, sex 
is going to happen, consensual or not, that it should be expected, and that the only way to avoid it 
is to stay out. In essence, sexual violence, aggression, and bullying are all being used as a means 
of keeping an all-boys club female free.  
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In August of this year (2014) Brian Adam Jones, a Marine veteran and current editor in 
chief of Task and Purpose, an online journalism forum for veterans, wrote a column on the 
connection between social media outlets and anti-women sentiments in the Marine Corps. The 
article, titled “The Sexist Facebook Movement the Marine Corps Can’t Stop,” was quickly 
shared by many members of the military community on Facebook and received enough attention 
that Facebook forcibly shut down the pages mentioned in the article. All of the pages are 
operated anonymously by members of the military, and some of them were back up the very next 
day via the creation of a new page under the same name. Figure 1.8 shows an example of the 
types of content posted to these Facebook pages.  
The most interesting and disturbing part is that while the individuals creating and 
maintain the page are anonymous, the thousands of individuals commenting on the content that 
is being posted are doing so under their own real names with their real pictures. As Jones (2014) 
puts it, “that these men, these US Marines, openly engage in this behavior, openly harass and 
denigrate women and minorities—under their real names, their real pictures, with no fear of 
repercussions—reflects a perceived tolerance of their actions.” When asked to comment on this 
social media movement amongst the military community, Jones (2014) stated that neither the 
Marine Corps nor the DoD was willing to address the issue or comment further. This  
unwillingness or inability to address the anti-women sentiments expressed by members of the 
military community on various social media outlets is part of the larger problem. The DoD and 
the various offices and departments it assigns the task of combating sexual assaults within its 
ranks, cannot honestly expect to be effective, when it refuses to acknowledge the sociocultural 





 This chapter has sought to lay a foundation of understanding the problem of sexual 
assaults within the United States Navy. Understanding the community characteristics and 
cultural phenomenon that occur within this community is essential for understanding any type of 
statistical analysis conducted later on in this study. Everything from rank and organizational 
structure, to the combat masculine warrior paradigm, to the hypermasculine workplace culture 
and its history is relevant in putting in context the results later on.  
 Several community elements discussed in this chapter have a crossover with traditional 
criminology and could possibly lead to the overall number of sexual assaults in the Navy 
behaving as expected. As mentioned previously in this chapter, these elements include age, 
education, gender, and income. Military demographics point towards a community that is 
comprised of majority young males without degrees, and while having a steady income, when 
the amount that is married with children is taken into account, is relatively low. These are all 
factors that criminologists have established are tied to general crime within society, and 
therefore, are relevant to a discussion of sexual assaults within the military community. 
Specifically, with regard to a discussion of military sexual assault, the testing of these 
demographics and their relationship to sexual assault is essential. In fact, later in this dissertation, 
regression models will be conducted in order to test the strength of the relationship between 
sexual assault victimization and gender with the assumption being that females will be more 
likely to be victims of sexual assault than males. 
 Some military community elements that are possibly contributing to sexual assaults are 
unique to this community however and required an expanded discussion here in order to be in 
line with a criminological understanding of the problem. As mentioned, these elements include 
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the CMW paradigm, the hypermasculine workplace culture, and the structural organization of the 
military. The CMW paradigm refers to the constant combat mentality of members of the military 
as it is their sole purpose to win any and all combat situations the US military is involved with. 
That is, they consider themselves to be warriors 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and this warrior 
mentality permeates all elements of daily life. Along with this however, is the concept that the 
profession of arms is considered to be inherently male and that all things female are simply not 
fit for the war making job. This manifests itself in the form of a hypermasculine culture that is 
obsessed with fostering alpha-male type-A personalities and eradicating any and all female 
elements (actual females, and feminine themes) from the combat workplace.  
These two elements, the CMW paradigm and hypermasculinity contribute to establishing 
women as second class citizens within the military workplace and thus their status as victims 
becomes more acceptable. Lastly, the rank and organizational structure of the military 
contributes to the fostering of sexual assaults within the community as it would just about any 
crime occurring within the community; leaders give orders, they are followed, no questions 
asked. A very strict leadership structure, while effective on the battlefield in defeating the 
enemy, is also effective in allowing negative behaviors to go on unchecked or challenged. When 
leadership isn’t questioned, bad behaviors can be swept under the rug or hidden behind an iron 





A REVIEW OF RELEVANT SEXUAL ASSAULT LITERATURE 
 
Sexual Assaults: What We Know So Far 
 Sexual assault literature is vast and well developed. It has been addressed by many 
different academic fields and encompasses many different categories included, but by no means 
limited to, victimology, understanding offender motivations, societal contributions to the crime, 
and crime within special communities (i.e. total institutions). While it was the goal of chapter 1 
to establish an understanding of the uniqueness of the military community and its culture, 
chapter 2 seeks to incorporate previously established sexual assault literature in both the civilian 
and military contexts into the discussion in order to arrive at an understanding that is consistent 
with previously established findings and a theoretical framework that is appropriate.    
 
Victims of Sexual Assault  
 As mentioned throughout this dissertation, for the purposes of this discussion, the sexual 
assaults being analyzed are heterosexual in nature. And while it is understood that female on 
male sexual assaults, and both male and female homosexual sexual assaults do occur, the far 
majority are male on female and as such, will be discussed in that context. The large majority of 
heterosexual sexual assault victims in both the civilian and military world are women. 
Understanding as much as possible about risk factors contributing to victimization of women in 
sexual assaults is a vital piece of the overall puzzle in terms of attempting to prevent these 
crimes. The literature on victims of sexual assault is varied with regard to context and appears to 
have a very strong showing of college/university sexual assault, sexual assault within 
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retirement/elderly facilities and prisons, and sexual assault of children. Military sexual assault 
literature appears to be predominantly clinical in nature and written for nurses, social workers, 
and counselors.  
 Currently established literature points to a list of possible risk factors for military sexual 
assault. Sadler et al. (2003) found that women who were raped while active duty military were 
more likely to joined the military at a younger age, more likely to be enlisted, and less likely to 
have earned a college degree than their colleagues who were not sexually assaulted while active 
duty. Likewise, Skinner et al. (2000) found that women in the military who reported being sexual 
assaulted were generally younger that those who reported not being sexually assaulted. Coyle et 
al. (1996) also found that enlisted women reported being sexually assaulted more often than 
officers. These studies have particular relevance to this discussion as the present study tests 
connections between age and rank (which partially accounts for presence of a college degree) 
with sexual assault in the Navy.  
There appear to be many similarities with regard to victims of civilian sexual assault and 
military sexual assault that revolve around two key similarities. Established literature points to 
both civilian and military victims of sexual assault being tied to alcohol use and partying (See for 
example Schwartz et al. 2001; Mouilso et al. 2012; Untied et al. 2013; Ullman et al. 2010) and 
prior sexual abuses (See for example Boney-McCoy, and Finkelhor 1995; Gidycz et al. 1993; 
Follette et al. 1996; Sadler et al. 2003; Sadler et al. 2004). While these similar risk factors will 
not be tested in this study, they are still relevant in that they add context for which to understand 
the results of this this study, and also provide a suggestion for future research.  
 There are also similarities when it comes to reporting, or not reporting the crimes as it 
appears that the concerns and fears of both civilian and military victims of sexual assault are 
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nearly identical. Civilian victims of sexual assault who do not report crimes do so, according to 
Sable et al. (2006) out of shame/fear/embarrassment, concerns about confidentiality, fear of not 
being believed, and fear of their perpetrator retaliating. Like their civilian sexual assault victim 
counterparts, victims of military sexual assault who do not report the crime do so out of fear of 
ridicule, gossip, being labeled a troublemaker, or concern that no action will be taken (Burgess et 
al., 2013; DoD 2011.)  
 Some differences between civilian and military victims of sexual assault exist and are 
worth discussing in order to more fully explore the issue. First, and probably most alarming, as 
Burgess et al. (2013) describe it, military sexual trauma (MST) occurs predominantly in the 
workplace whereas civilian rape occurs more often in social settings; MST victims are often 
times forced to live and work with their perpetrators and their success and failure of their careers, 
and even their own safety, is often times tied to their assaulter. Often times, according to Burgess 
et al. (2013) victims must seek the approval of their perpetrator (or his friends/associates) in 
order to be referred/allowed to seek medical treatment. Further, victims of MST are often time 
forced to choose between taking official action to stop the abuse, which will often times result in 
extreme damage to their career, or keeping quiet and accepting to potential for a repeat of abuse, 
but keeping their career on track (Burgess et al, 2013; Street and Stafford 2004). It is also worth 
noting that in cases of military sexual trauma, sexual harassment was strongly tied to a later 
sexual assault occurrence (Murdoch et al., 2006). 
 In a discussion of any crime, it is easy to get lost in the social science aspect of it, the 
situational details, the cultural elements contributing to it, and forget that there are actual victims. 
These victims of military sexual trauma experience a variety of negative life-altering 
consequences including, but not limited to, unwanted pregnancy, STDs, and non-combat related 
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PTSD (Burgess et al. 2013) future substance abuse problems (Hankin et al. 1999), and future 
psychiatric disorders (Saris and Lind 2008; Seedat and Stein, 2000). Understanding what victims 
of military sexual assault have in common with each other and with their civilian counterparts is 
an essential first step in understanding the whole problem. A key part to this understanding a 
testing of the relationship between some of the demographic characteristics discussed here and 
sexual assault victimization. In fact, later in this dissertation, regression models will be 
conducted in order to test the strength of the relationship between sexual assault victimization 
and gender with the assumption being that females will be more likely to be victims of sexual 
assault than males.  
Preventative measures aimed only at the perpetrators potentially excludes valuable 
information regarding the victims. Understanding the full impact that military sexual assault has 
on its victims serves as the motivation necessary to continue the exploration of this problem. 
Moving forward with this specific discussion, exploring the victim characteristics within the US 
Navy here in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia and comparing them to the understood 
victim characteristics of DoN-SAPRO, will provide a further understanding of the problem upon 
which continued successful preventative can be enacted.   
   
Perpetrators of Sexual Assault 
 Relevant to this discussion, and as mentioned above, perpetrators of sexual assault are 
most often male. Berkowitz (1992) does a thorough job of covering the literature available on 
understanding sexual assaults and acquaintance rape and says that perpetrators of this crime who 
are of a college age have a lot in common. Specifically, that many American men are socialized, 
or become the product of a society that is accepting/tolerant, and perhaps even encouraging of, 
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rape and sexual assault. The socialization of men to avoid all things “sissy” and feminine and to 
be aggressive and unemotional in all aspects of daily life leads to a set of attitudes that can 
contribute to sexual assault as well. These attitudes take the form of rape myths and their 
acceptance by the community can allow for sexual assaults to happen. According to (Burt 1991) 
some of the most popular rape myths include beliefs that the victim wanted/deserved the assault 
that happened, that no harm was done, or that the crime itself didn’t actually happen.  In a more 
recent analysis of rape myths, Grubb and Turner (2012) found differences between males and 
females with regard to acceptance of rape myths. Higher levels of rape myth acceptance were 
found in groups of men rather than women, and men also placed blame for the assault on women 
more often. They also found that women who violate traditional gender roles are attributed more 
blame than those women who do not; and women who consume alcohol prior to their attack are 
attributed higher levels of blame than those who are not intoxicated.  
 These findings regarding perpetrators’ attitudes towards rape myth acceptance are 
interesting with regard to furthering the understanding of military sex assaults. As will be 
mentioned shortly, the military has a long standing history/tradition of alcohol use. Accepted 
alcohol abuse within the military community, combined with the fact that, as discussed in 
chapter 1, the military is predominantly comprised of males who have been socialized to be 
extremely masculine, could lead to sex assaults occurring. Further, Grub and Turner’s (2012) 
finding concerning the acceptance of victim blaming with regard to women who do not conform 
to traditional gender roles (i.e. a female soldier/sailor) could offer another explanation of the 
sociocultural causes of sexual assault in place. Essentially, women’s role within the military 




 The issue of specific personality characteristics of sexual assault perpetrators has also 
been addressed previously. What is interested, is that, as Berkowitz (1992) points out, most of 
the studies do not indicate some sort of psychiatric ailment or some other psychological 
disturbance; more poignantly, “normal” men that do not display these psychological issues are 
just as likely as those who do to commit a sexual assault/acquaintance rape. This finding rings 
true in this discussion on military sexual assault because of society’s conceptualization of the 
military as the “white hat” wearers of society. Much of the initial outrage, and even 
unwillingness to accept that these crimes were happening within the community (even so far as 
to blame the women or express suspicion of their stories) rests in the idea that our military is not 
comprised of “those kinds of people.” Now we understand that sexual assaults and “those types 
of people” are not connected after all, and moving forward, this line of logic needs to be done 
away with in ongoing exploration of these crimes within the military community. 
 Researchers have however, identified a reliable set of personality characteristics that are 
present in sexual assault offenders. Generally speaking, sexual assault offenders will have in 
common all, some, most, or any of the following; early/very young first time sexual experiences, 
multiple sexual experiences at a very young age, overall hostility towards women, general 
irresponsibility, lack of social conscience, values legitimizing aggression towards women, and a 
need for dominance over sexual partners (Berkowitz 1992; Koss and Dinero 1989; Malamuth 
1986; and Rapaport and Burkhardt 1994) More recent research appears to support these findings 
somewhat. Abbey and Jacques-Tiura (2011) took into account the previously established 
research when they examined the tactics that perpetrators of sexual assault utilize finding that, 
few perpetrators actually resorted to physical force, but rather, relied on verbal coercion and the 
victim’s impairment. Since a good amount of sexual assault cases within the military report 
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intimidation, coercion, and alcohol as having played a role in the sexual assault, these findings 
appear to be consistent and applicable to the military case.  
  
Total Institutions and Sexual Assault 
 As long as complex societies have existed, there has also existed total institutions within 
them. And of late, sexual assaults within total institutions has become a focus for social scientists 
(See for example Beck et al., 2013; Crossmaker, 1991; Teaster and Roberto, 2004.) 
Understanding sexual assaults within total institutions could be helpful in understanding sexual 
assaults within the military community as the military is generally considered to be a total 
institution. Total institutions are ones that are estranged from the larger society by either physical 
barriers or social and cultural standards. Goffman (1957) outlined five different types of total 
institutions containing different types of individuals; those who are unable to care for themselves 
but are harmless (nursing home), those that are a harm to themselves and society unintentionally 
(psychiatric institution), those who are purposefully harmful to society (prisons), those pursuing 
a specialized task/service to society (military bases), those seeking solace or a retreat from 
society (religious compounds). Goffman (1957) further states that total institutions are 
characterized by the fact that all the individuals within eat, sleep, and play together. They do 
these activities in the company of large groups of other similarly situated individuals, and that 
the activities that they all participate in are heavily regulated and part of a larger overall plan for 
the institution. There could be no better example of a total institution than a military base, or 
even, the military community has a whole. 
 The discussion of the military as a total institution is important because in terms of 
understanding sexual assaults within it, examining the literature concerning sexual assaults 
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within other total institutions may be a logical starting place. The two total institutions that are 
closest in characteristics with a military community for the purpose of comparison would be 
college campuses and surprisingly, prisons. Both of these institutions have large populations that 
matriculate in the same area that are close in age to a military community, and both are 
supervised/regulated by a much smaller group within the institution (faculty/staff and 
correctional officers respectively).  
 The comparison between college campuses and military populations is not a new one 
(See for example, Bachman et al. 1987; Franke 1998; Franke 2001; Hammill et al. 1995; Holsti 
1997; Kleykamp 2006; Morris 1983; Segal and Segal 2004, and countless others). Both college 
campuses and military communities are similar in age groups and are just leaving home for the 
first time. They both are also large populations that have been given a task (earn a degree, defend 
the nation respectively) and are supervised by a smaller group within the institution 
(professors/staff, and military officers respectively). They are both at times under stress and at 
times subject to strict rules, regulations and schedules. These commonalities and others make 
them logical comparison groups.  
 Fortunately for the researcher interested in studying sexual assaults in the military, much 
has been done with sexual assaults on college campuses. Examining the literature on sexual 
assaults on college campuses will perhaps shed light on sexual assaults within the military 
community. Two major themes dominate college campus sexual assault literature; the role of 
alcohol, and male perpetrators/male group peer pressure. Not surprisingly, because of the 
commonalities between college campuses and military communities in terms of age and life 
stage (See chapter 1), both of these themes are also very present in the current understanding of 
military sexual assault.  
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 The role that alcohol use plays in sexual assault on college campuses has been thoroughly 
examined. Several studies have attempted to measure the prevalence of alcohol related sexual 
assaults on college campuses (See for example, Frintner and Rubinson, 1993; Harrington and 
Leitenberg, 1994; Gross and Billingham, 1998). Expanding on the measurements of the problem, 
Perkins (2002:94) identifies four common themes in the literature explaining increased risk of 
sexual assault with alcohol use on college campuses; (1) increased consensual activity prior to 
the forced activity due to lowered inhibitions, (2) the cultural stereotype of women who drink as 
more promiscuous or “easy”, (3) the diminished ability to consent or object to the activity, and 
(4) the diminished ability to physically resist or fight off an attack. These four themes would 
easily be applicable to the military community, and would dictate future research ideas, as the 
military community has a well-documented and studied connection to alcohol use (See for 
example, Ames et al., 2007; Bachman et al., 1999; Bray and Hourani, 2007; Pack, 1995). 
Moving forward from this study, alcohol and its connection to military sex assaults should be 
examined more thoroughly.    
 The role that male perpetrators/male group peer pressure plays in sexual assault on 
college campuses has also been thoroughly examined. A more thorough examination of the role 
of masculinity and male peer groups in sexual assaults in the military is explored in chapter 1, 
but it is worth noting the consistency in both of the total institutions; military and 
college/university communities. In a study on college fraternities and their connection to sexual 
assault, Martin and Hummer (1989) found that [similar to] military communities, fraternities 
possess a concern with a narrow, stereotypical conception of masculinity and heterosexuality; a 
preoccupation with loyalty, protection of the group, and secrecy; the use of alcohol as a weapon 
against women's sexual reluctance; the pervasiveness of violence and physical force; and an 
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obsession with competition, superiority, and dominance. It is these values according to Martin 
and Hummer (1989) that are directly responsible for the continued sexual victimization of 
women who find themselves encountering fraternity type men.  
 Combining these, the alcohol use and male perpetrator/male peer pressure connections to 
sexual assault, to the military has really only been barely touched on of late. Applying findings 
about sexual assault on civilian college campuses to military academies appears to be the most 
logical starting place. In a comparison of the service academies to civilian colleges and 
universities, Brubaker (2009) states that sexual harassment or “rape testing” is often a precursor 
to a sexual assault and found that in the service academies, nearly half of women said they had 
experienced some form of sexual harassment, with the Air Force Academy being slightly more 
than half. Interestingly, this number was very similar to what women at civilian colleges and 
universities reported. Brubaker (2009) also found that while 90 percent of civilian university 
students reported that their assaulter was known to them, the service academy surveys did not 
ask this question, but did ask victims if their offender was a fellow cadet/midshipman to which 
83 – 97% in 2005 and 82 – 86% in 2006 responded affirmatively (Brubaker 2006; Cook et al, 
2005; Lipari et al, 2006).  
One difference discovered between the two, civilian and military colleges, was that the 
rate of reporting the sexual assault was found to be higher at the service academies than at the 
civilian schools (Brubaker 2006; Cook et al, 2005; Lipari et al, 2006).  This could perhaps point 
towards more faith in the military institution to handle the issue, or also a difference in the 
beliefs/personality characteristics in the women at the service academies than the civilian 
universities. The information above is valuable in that it further solidifies the connection between 
these two total institutions; college campuses and the military. Findings on sexual assault in this 
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one institution, universities, then could be applicable to another, the military, and in terms of 
exploring the somewhat unexplored topic of military sexual assaults, this is valuable.  
 The other total institution worth examining as a comparison to the military community 
would be prisons. This may be a shocking and surprising comparison (and perhaps even a bit 
offensive), but it is logical. Both prisons and military bases/naval ships are instruments of the 
state; one aimed at detaining criminals, the other aimed at allocating the resources necessary for 
national defense. Both prisons and military bases are home to large populations, the majority of 
which are male and relatively younger. These large prison populations, just like military bases, 
are governed by a smaller group of individuals (military officers and correctional officers). Just 
like military bases, prisons maintain a very clear physical barrier separating themselves from the 
rest of the community, making it extremely difficult for individuals to pass through that heavily 
armed barrier. And while inmates find themselves in a prison because they have wronged 
society, and military personnel find themselves on a military base or naval ship because of their 
noble desire to serve their country, for both populations, the message is very clear, you are not 
free to leave and your time is not your own.  
Most relevant to this discussion on the understanding of sexual assaults however, is two 
points; first, that both of these total institutions operate daily on the basis of a social hierarchy, 
and second, that both of these total institutions conduct their business with nearly no direct 
observation from the outside world. Prisons have a very clear split between inmates and guards, 
and then a very informal hierarchy amongst the inmates. The military, as discussed in chapter 1, 
has a very clear, very formal divide between officers and enlisted, and a formal hierarchy 
amongst the two groups. However, the military does also have a social hierarchy amongst its 
smaller groups comprised of personnel of similar ranks. Nils et al. (2009) examined bullying in a 
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Navy community (Norwegian) and found that where leadership was interpreted to be unfair, 
bullying was more prevalent. This demonstrates the ability of the members of the military unit to 
enforce their own social hierarchy in order to establish their own view of order where their 
leadership simply will not. This bullying trend behaves much as would be expected in a prison 
according to (South and Wood 2006:494; Ireland 2000), “social hierarchy seems to be inherent 
in the prison system and prisons appear to be encouraging such a social system as bullies are 
given high status by both prisoners and staff.” 
The following quote from Gresham Sykes’ The Society of the Captives could easily allow 
for the word prisons to be substituted with military bases, and inmates for soldiers/sailors, and 
still make perfect accurate sense, 
The massive body of regulations which is erected as a blueprint for behavior 
within the prison and to which the inmate must respond; this social order 
represents a means, a method of achieving certain goals or accomplishing certain 
tasks; and, as we have pointed out before, the nature of this social order becomes 
clear only when we understand the ends it is supposed to serve. (Sykes 1958:13)  
 
As discussed in detail in chapter 1, the military has a very strict hierarchy and its purpose is to 
allow for success in combat situations. The prison likewise has a social hierarchy and its purpose 
is to control daily order within the prison so that there is not constant chaos requiring the 
constant involvement of the guards/correctional officers. At any given time in both prison and 
military communities, someone further up the food chain is turning a blind eye on a behavior that 
is technically against the rules, so long as it serves to keep the larger population settled. Bryant 
(1979:57) would refer to this as his 6th facilitator of general military crime, the “official 
toleration of military deviancy.”  
…considering the mission of the military and the tasks expected of its members, a 
major problem is maintaining morale, neutralizing frustration and anxiety among 
the troops, and motivating personnel to channel aggressive goals properly. To 
accomplish this also requires some relaxation of the strict and pervasive norms 
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that govern military life. The troops have to “let off steam” as a disciplinary 
safety valve… (Bryant 1979:58)  
 
Much the same way a prison guard may ignore the fact that cigarettes are being smuggled 
into the prison in the interest of keeping the inmates happy and therefore more manageable, a 
military officer may ignore a late return after a soldier’s Christmas leave time in order to keep 
moral high within the group. There is constant evaluation on the part of the guardians entrusted 
with managing both military communities and prison populations with regard to the rules and 
regulations; a type of balance between meeting the needs of the institution and allowing for basic 
human freedom. It is in this very necessary and deserved freedom however that problems can 
arise.   
The freedom of the prisoner, whether it is granted in the name of humanity, 
economic efficiency, or reformation, and limited though it may be, creates a 
situation in which crimes among inmates are possible. Theft, murder, fraud, 
sodomy—all exist as possible acts of deviance within the prison and the 
custodians have the duty of preventing them from being converted into realities. 
(Sykes 1958:17)  
 
 As with the prison, when the social hierarchy of the military community fails to control 
behaviors and protect the individual members of its community, it becomes the duty of the 
officers to reestablish order. With the current sexual assault problem that the military faces, the 
officers appear to be at a loss and part of that is the lack of fully understanding the problem. As it 
stands right now however, the social system of the military community’s response to the sexual 
assaults has taken on a situation similar to the post prison riot situation,  
The social system of the prison finally reaches a point where the inmates have 
established their own unofficial version of control. The custodians, in effect, have 
withdrawn to the walls to concentrate on their most obvious task, prevention of 
escapes. The outward guise of the custodians’ dominance within the walls is 
preserved, to be sure, for inmates are still counted, some infractions of the rules 
are still punished, and prisoners continue to be marched back and forth from their 




 The same post crisis situation is seen in the military community, and has been seen 
during every non-immediate combat time since WWI. In times where there is no imminent 
combat situation present the military reverts back to the social hierarchy dominating the 
community and dictating acceptable behaviors within it.  As was discussed in chapter one, this 
applies most especially, for the purpose of this discussion, to the use of sexual assault and rape as 
a means of protecting the combat brotherhood and weeding out women from combat situations. 
Essentially, the informal social hierarchy of the military community at times comes to believe 
that anything feminine does not have a place in the military, and as such, enforces the informal 
social hierarchy and weeds them out. 
 Sadly, just as the prison guards ignore the fact that the prisoners are running the show, the 
higher ranking officers ignore the problem of sexual assaults, preferring instead to focus on the 
task at hand, defending the nation, and assigning the task of  “dealing with” sexual assaults to a 
lower ranking officer who likewise passes it off. Offenders, or worse, victims, are shuffled from 
one unit to the next so as to sweep any past sexual assault under the rug and not actually deal 
with it, all while at the same time, continuing to maintain an outward appearance of a cohesive 
functioning military community. Were it not for the few brave women who took their stories 
public, their injustices would have stayed hidden, locked behind the walls of a very secure total 
institution.  
 
Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Sexual Assault in the Military Community 
 In Berkowitz’s (1992) literature review on sexual assaults and acquaintance rape on 
college campuses discussed above, he lays out a philosophical understanding that may have great 
relevancy to understanding the military sexual assault problem in that it sets a precedent for a 
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focus on victim and offender characteristics as the basis of that understanding. Berkowitz 
(1992:176) states that, 
This model of sexual assault considers the relative influence of perpetrator 
characteristics, situational variables associated with sexual assault, the degree to 
which the perpetrator misperceives the sexual intent of his partner, and victim 
characteristics associated with women’s increased risk of victimization.  
 
This model incorporates an understanding of the cultural/situational setting of the assaults, with 
an understanding of victim and offender characteristics in order to arrive at a full picture of the 
problem.  
 
Figure 2.1-Berkowitz Sexual Assault Model 
 
  
As demonstrated in the literature, a major theme that appears in both military and civilian 
sexual assaults is the absence of a capable guardian/supervision. Immediately, this theme calls to 
attention, in the mind of the criminologist research, routine activities theory, RAT. Within 
criminology, the debate over whether or not RAT is a theory or perspective rages on. It is not the 
purpose of this project to contribute to this debate as it is not the purpose of this project to test 
RAT and its connection to sexual assaults. It is however, the prerogative of this project to use 
57 
	  
RAT as the logical and common sense framework through which a discussion of sexual assaults 
within the military can rest.  Perhaps future research could test RAT’s connection to military 
sexual assaults, but for right now, it will simply be used as the naturally occurring context 
through which a conversation about military sexual assaults can occur. 
 Routine activities theory suggests that crime activities are a function of the frequency of 
attractive victims, motivated offenders and weak or absent guardians coming together in the 
same location, and as such, is a better framework for this topic (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Sherman, 
et al., 1989). Felson and Cohen (1980) expanded on their routine activities theory by suggesting 
that crime is not necessarily just the result of a predatory or malicious attitude, but rather, a 
motivated offender taking advantage of the routine activities of their suitable targets. Felson and 
Cohen (1980) expand further on this idea saying that certain routine activities present a variety of 
criminogenic situations.  
Routine Activities Theory is the natural and common sense framework for this project 
because of the dictates of previous literature. Many of the previous studies concerning 
perpetrators of sexual assault and the characteristics thereof, contribute to one overriding theme, 
who commits this crime and why . Furthermore, there is an extensive basis for utilizing RAT in 
conjunction with a feminist perspective as the theoretical perspective for a sexual assault study 
(Mustaine, and Tewksbury 2002; Schwartz and Pitts 1995; Schwartz et al. 2001)  
When RAT is applied to the military sexual assault situation, one can see how the three 
elements, motivated offender, absent capable guardian, and suitable target could be easily be 
intermingled. Essentially, the sociocultural concepts discussed in chapter one (hypermasculinity, 
traditional male workplace conscious) contribute to the motivation for the “motivated offender” 
element. The sociocultural elements described in chapter one contribute to a general anti-female 
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sentiment amongst some men within the community. This sentiment leads to a motivation to 
commit sexual assault in line with the bullying and continued protection of the warrior 
brotherhood concepts that are also discussed in length in chapter one.  Absence of a capable 
guardian is seen in certain situations within military life; for example, certain situations in boot 
camps and combat where supervision is low. To counteract this supervision issue, the military 
has implemented a “battle buddy” system, and female soldiers/sailors are encouraged to take a 
same sex partner to the showers and off-hour social engagements with them. Increasing the 
presence of persons, both male and female, can reduce the risk to the assault occurring. The 
suitability of the target concept could be interpreted to include physical nature of women and the 
social encouragement of women to be “people pleasers” that will keep quiet in the aftermath of a 
sexual assault. Likewise, women being the minority, and also interpreted as the threat to the 
warrior brotherhood, become the obvious suitable target.  
Rosen et al. (2003) discussed the results of the integration of women into combat units. If 
the integration of women into the armed forces is no longer an issue, and is accepted by the 
majority of service personnel, then how is it that the sexual assault problem is continuing on? 
There appears to be a collision of the minority who believe women do not belong due to the the 
dominant hypermasculine culture, and the opportunity to act on these beliefs. This collision 
happens slowly and over time and is spurred on by the sociocultural elements that were 
discussed in chapter one. Specifically, the informal cultural values that are expressed publicly via 
social media and other outlets; the derogatory jokes and cartoons, the continued perpetuation of 
the dependapotomus myth are all negative and perhaps even disliked sociocultural characteristics 
that contribute to an anti-female sentiment. Acceptance of the culture’s disliked characteristics is 
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the end result, and more specifically, an understanding of how sexual assaults could occur/a 
blaming of the victim becomes ingrained in the overall consciousness of the community.  
Put simply, for some reason, a very small percentage of the very large US Navy 
community is motivated to commit sexual assaults, and there are threads of commonality with 
regard to this motivation amongst the offenders. Understanding the motivation then becomes 
essential to addressing the overall sexual assault problem, and understanding the motivation 
starts with exploring the characteristics of the offender.  
 A suitable target is the second required element of RAT. In this instance, and as will be 
demonstrated statistically in the next section, the far majority of sexual assaults within the 
military community involve female victims. Here again, there exists threads of commonality 
amongst the victims that constitute them suitable targets. Exploring these characteristics allows 
for a better understanding of the suitability concept and therefore contributes to potential 
preventative action.  
 Lastly, the absence of a capable guardian is very strong theme that is present in much of 
the sexual assault literature. Much the same way that college campuses have recommended 
buddy systems for social engagements, the military has as well. Recommending a buddy system, 
essentially placing a guardian in the situation or increasing supervision, directly addresses the 
concept that where there is a capable guardian, there is less crime, or in this case, sexual assault. 
The Navy may refer to the concept as one thing, and criminologists another, but the common 
sense approach is the same; increase the people in the situation, provide supervision, and 






 This chapter has discussed all relevant sexual assault literature currently available. 
Military sexual assault has been discussed in conjunction with established literature on victim 
characteristics, offender characteristics and within the context of total institutions. This 
comparison was done so for the purposes of understanding the overall military sexual assault 
problem, and to provide a context for understanding the relevancy of the current study. Routine 
activities theory is the theoretical perspective guiding this work and its exploration of victim and 





THE CRIMINOLOGY-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND THE CURRENT STUDY: 
UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL ASSAULTS WITHIN THE US NAVY 
 
Part 1: The Criminology/Academia-Military Relationship 
“We have called academia. We’ve called the lawyers, the psychologists, the social 
workers. Academia has not been able to provide us with a model with documented efficacy in 
preventing sexual assaults. This is not a research project for us…” Dr. Paul Garst, Deputy 
Director of the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, had that to say via a phone 
interview in response to a question about the Navy’s attempts to address sexual assault within 
their community.  
 The relationship between the military and academia has been rocky over the last 50 plus 
years to say the least. Trust on both sides is lacking, the goals of both sides are at times vastly 
different, both sides are subject to bureaucratic oversight, and yet both sides benefit greatly at 
times from the complicated relationship. The military, like any town or community experiencing 
a problem, has looked to subject matter experts to try to help understand and address the 
problem. Understanding that relationship is relevant in understanding the literature that currently 
exists concerning sexual assaults within the military, and is also relevant in exploring the future 
of this topic.  
 
The Unwillingness of US Military to Work with Criminologists/Academia 
One major reason that the military does not want to cooperate with criminologists is 
because of the Military’s existing tumultuous relationship with the media. Think of the US 
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Military as essentially married to the media as Boyland (2011:2) suggests, “the honeymoon is 
long since over and both of us have seen the best and worst of each other. The partners cannot 
divorce or even think of asking for a permanent separation. They are forever linked and stay 
together for the sake of the children.” The “children” in this metaphor are the American tax 
paying citizens who want to know what our armed forces are up to, as well as the everyday 
average military folk abroad who believe that there is, “only one thing worse than losing a war, 
and that is fighting a war that people at home have forgotten or have no interest in” (Hsia 2011) 
 This metaphoric marriage has been going on for a very long time, and it has been filled 
with tension since the beginning. Boyland (2011:2) captures this sentiment adequately, 
It appears we have appointed our worst generals to command our forces, and our 
most gifted and brilliant to edit newspapers! In fact, I discovered by reading 
newspapers that these editor-geniuses plainly saw all my strategic defects from 
the start, yet failed to inform me until it was too late. Accordingly, I’m readily 
willing to yield my command to these obviously superior intellects and I’ll, in 
turn, do my best for the cause by writing editorials—after the fact. (General 
Robert E. Lee: 1863) 
 
This sarcastic sound bite from Robert E. Lee points to a strained relationship due to blaming and 
criticizing on both sides. This trend has continued long since the Civil War. The media will 
disagree with military strategy or battle field decisions and will go air the marriage’s dirty 
laundry in a public forum. Likewise, when the media has stepped out of place and acted in such a 
way that is damaging to troops or their families, the military has made a point of drawing public 
attention to it.  
Hsia (2011) writing for the New York Times observed two instances, for example, where 
the media acted in such a way that was harmful to military families or the military itself: the first 
being when many members of Hsia’s unit were killed in action and the embedded reporter 
published the names before families could be notified by the DoD, and the second came when an 
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embedded reporter, observing a firefight, decided to publish the names of troops the reporter felt 
were “holding back” in the fight. Both of these examples do not require an explanation. They 
were not the first, nor the only time these types of things have happened in this “marriage.”  
Carrying on with this metaphor then, the military, like most government organizations, 
doesn’t trust a working relationship with another independent institution that it doesn’t have 
wrapped up safely in contracts and legalese. Like a jaded jilted lover, they have been burned in 
the past, and they are cautious in entering into relationships in the future. Essentially, if the US 
military can’t control the flow of information, they would rather error on the side of not releasing 
it in the first place for the sake of not having to deal with any negatives that could occur.  
This is not to say that the military and academia have not been involved in the past. It’s 
actually quite the opposite. It has however, been a much more hushed secret affair. This 
relationship started during WWI when the military realized they were not going to win the war 
without gaining an upper hand. Martino-Taylor (2008:38) building upon C. Wright Mill’s (1956) 
works on the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex, “posit[s] that American universities play a 
greater role; many are cogs in the same complicit war machine.”  She goes on to state that the US 
military contracted chemistry departments, physics departments, biology departments, 
psychology departments and schools of medicine at countless universities nationwide, including 
Ivy League schools, prestigious technical schools and state schools, to use their knowledge of 
science to create weapons that would win the war. Huge amounts of money were poured into 
these schools for the purposes of this research, and later, extensive testing on both animal and 
human subjects.  
This information becoming public, as it clearly is, represents one of the dark marks on the 
history of the military. Being associated with testing weapons on human subjects (American 
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citizen human subjects) is an embarrassment they will not soon outrun. And even though the US 
military is still deeply involved with American universities for the purposes of research, this 
relationship has changed. The government started creating its own think tanks and filling them 
with researchers of university caliber. After all, a think tank separate from universities that exist 
solely to do a specific type of research that is contracted by the US military and is tied up in all 
sorts of legal contract tape, tends to stay more private, and out of the media. Instead of the only 
option for the military being going to a university that does the type of research they need, they 
can lure qualified professors with incentives of large salaries and grants to do the work they need 
away from the prying and public eyes of a university. Essentially, with better control of how the 
research is done, the military can keep their spouse, the media, out of it.  
This changing military-academic relationship explains much of why the military is 
hesitant to get involved with criminologists at an academic level. Their problematic past aside, 
the military typically only involves itself with research it needs; if the military feels they do not 
have a problem to solve, then there is zero need for research addressing said non-problem. Until 
the last few years, crime was not on the military’s radar, and some would argue, it still isn’t. This 
strained relationship is particularly problematic with regard to the military sex assault issue, or as 
Steiger et al. (2010; Groves 2013: 748) put it, “it is an extremely sensitive topic, especially 
within the military arena and, therefore, does not lend itself to openness with reporting or 
willingness to discuss interventions.”  
Getting crime, and specifically sexual assaults, on the military’s radar will require a few 
things; first, unfortunately, instances of crime within these communities will have to continue to 
increase in appearance in the media. Sexual assaults in the military have taken the spotlight in 
the last year, and as recently as September of 2013, mass shootings have unfortunately made an 
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appearance. Media that is local to towns that host major military installations have always ran 
pieces on fraud and misappropriation of funds, but it hasn’t really received the occupational-
crime attention it deserves. Second, public outcry over the continued increase in appearance of 
military crime stories in the media will lead to pressure being placed on the military to solve the 
problem. Lastly, the military will have to come to the conclusion that the problem is 
criminal/deviant in nature and thus requires the expertise of criminologists to address. Because 
these three things have yet to happen (although it appears close at hand) the military isn’t exactly 
beating down the door of criminologists to hand over data and request answers to their problems.  
 
Disinterest on the Part of Criminologists in Crime within the US Military  
The military isn’t the only one to blame in this gap in criminology literature. 
Criminologists themselves haven’t necessarily been beating down the military’s door requesting 
data and asking to research their communities. Criminologists have long held an interest in 
studying special communities. The increased emphasis on a “war on terror” and the subsequent 
surge of troops sent to the Middle East and other parts of the world has renewed the focus that 
society and politicians place on the military. Many communities that had previously remained 
geographically or socially isolated from military bases and military communities have found 
themselves, in the past decade or so, interacting with them now on a regular basis via the 
increased privatization and outsourcing of services provided to military members and their 
families, resulting in the placement of civilian contractors within the military community 
(Bowen et al. 2001; Knox and Price 1999).   
The military bases themselves, and the communities that reside within and around the 
bases operate, differently than non-military communities and are worthy of examination because, 
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just like non-military communities, military communities are experiencing rates of crime and 
deviant behavior. Understanding what makes these communities different, and what community 
factors could potentially be contributing to these rates of crime and deviant behavior is a 
worthwhile endeavor as it expands the currently established criminological literature. 
Specifically, as mentioned in the previous chapter, understanding the sociological and cultural 
elements of these communities is essential for understanding the current sexual assault problem. 
As mentioned above, previously studied special communities present criminologists with 
a challenge in that these communities are not like “normal” communities because they present a 
special set of circumstances that are not present in mainstream society. Prisons are characterized 
by a loss of freedom and forced detention. Boarding schools and retirement homes have been 
studied as isolated communities. Impoverished communities are characterized by the stress that 
comes with the members of the community and their inability to afford items essential to 
everyday life and also a lack of mobility. Much like these two examples of special communities, 
military communities exhibit characteristics of isolation, some infringements upon freedoms, and 
stress. These characteristics, while similar to other special communities, are better described as 
completely different than those of previously studied special communities.  
 Military communities, regardless of the branch of service experience three common 
characteristics that, while not unique to just military communities, manifest themselves in a 
completely unique way and result in unique circumstances. Isolation (both physical and mental), 
moderate losses of freedoms, and stress (resulting from both personal and professional situations 
associated with life in the military), contribute to the uniqueness of the military community, and 
possibly, the crimes and deviant behavior that occur within.  
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 Isolation is not typically a term associated with the military. With over 688,000 active 
duty personnel in the United States today (U.S. Department of Defense 2010), surely isolation is 
not a factor in these communities. The opposite is true however. Isolation acts at both the 
individual and the group level in both a physical and mental capacity. The individual could feel 
isolated because, leaving a family environment situated within mainstream society in order to 
join a military community leaves the individual feeling mentally isolated from their non-military 
family and friends as they may have to move far away and “leave” time in order to visit may be 
hard to come by. Members of a military community could collectively feel isolated from the rest 
of society because of their shared experiences that the rest of society, “just don’t understand.” 
Physically, the individual is isolated from mainstream society in that they may live on base, or in 
a foreign country, or on a ship as part of their military service. Collectively, military 
communities are physically isolated because of their secure bases and ships which are not 
accessible by the rest of mainstream society and therefore present a physical separation.  
 The loss of freedoms associated with military service are not often considered when 
examining a military community. Members of the military forfeit many freedoms that regular 
citizens exercise every day. The loss of these freedoms is another characteristics that contributes 
to the uniqueness of the military community. Upon entering the military, the individual is no 
longer free to say whatever they wish. Insubordination is not tolerated, leaking classified 
information is met with criminal penalties, and publicly speaking out against policies is met with 
a lack of career advancement or forced discharge. Members of the military are also no longer in 
control of their own time like regular citizens. Whereas a private citizen can simply choose to 
leave any given day and travel or visit wherever and whomever they wish, members of the 
military are not allowed to leave without approval. A private citizen may have to show up to 
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work by a certain time or risk losing their job, but a member of the military must show up on 
time every time and be exactly where they are supposed to be or risk physical detention or 
criminal charges. This lack of control over one’s time or physical place is not a characteristic 
unique to military communities in that prison and school communities also exhibit this 
characteristic, however the application of controlled timing and placement of individuals is 
unique within the military community. 
 Lastly, stress plays a major role within military communities and perhaps is the 
characteristic that separates a military community from other special communities most 
completely. The military community is not made up of just members of the military, but also 
their spouses and children. Stress is exhibited by not only the individual service personnel, but 
also their families. Children exhibit stress concerning having to relocate again or having a parent 
be deployed again (Mmari et al. 2010). Spouses exhibit stress concerning their children’s 
reaction to the moves and the deployed parent (Mmari et al. 2012) as well as the stress associated 
with a loved one being in harm’s way and having to parent alone while they are away (Graves 
and Moriarty 2000). The military members themselves face stress in many different capacities; 
there is the stress associated with being deployed, the stress that personal/family problems 
causes, and stress associated with continued testing and requirements related to work 
performance which many times dictates career advancement or stagnation. While many special 
communities that have previously been studied might exhibit stressful conditions, the stresses 
associated with military communities are unique.  
Even with the above established literature, the topic of crimes within the military, and 
sexual assaults within the military specifically, still represents a major gap in criminological 
literature. There appeares to have been a slight interest around the time that the Vietnam War 
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was occurring, but any interest quickly dropped off and the field has yet to see a resurgence. This 
interest tends to have taken on an occupational or state crime approach as many reports of drug 
running by US military personnel as well as crimes on Vietnamese citizens were making their 
way out of the region and into the minds of American citizens back home. Sociologists have long 
had a strong military research base, and it appears that it is only growing, so the question then 
becomes, why have the criminologists not taken what the sociologists have done and run with it.  
 Most of the studies that have been conducted by social scientists over time can be broken 
down into the following categories; (1) military organization, leadership effectiveness and 
sociology of the military, (2) risky, self-destructive, and substance abuse behaviors by military 
personnel, (3) gender and sexuality studies, and (4) spouse, children and community studies. 
Absent from that list are crime and military community studies. This is not to say that the crime 
and military communities link has never been explored, it definitely has been (Bouffard 2003; 
Bryant 1979; Hakeem 1946; Mercier and Mercier 2000). The problem however is that these 
studies were conducted at least, if not more than, thirty years ago, (or using data from that time 
period), in a military that was very different than the one this nation has today, situated in a 
global community that is very different today than it was then, fighting wars that are very 
different. The research that was conducted then is relevant as it is all that we as social scientists 
have, but it is outdated and desperately needs to be replaced.  
 Crime in these previous studies is often covered under the broader concept of deviant 
behavior. It is treated as such because of two main reasons; first, the majority of studies that 
were conducted were done so in a sociological framework which treats all of these behaviors that 
go against the norms the same, and two, because military communities designate many behaviors 
as “crimes” under the UCMJ that civilian society does not. These status offenses need to be 
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studied in some common language and deviant behavior provides that. Topics such as non-felony 
spousal abuse, alcohol use (and now marijuana use in states/towns where it is legal), extra-
marital affairs, sexual relationships between personnel of different ranks, sexual relations 
between personnel of any rank while deployed, other risky/self-destructive behaviors, non-
participation in community, and  insubordination are behaviors that would not carry with them a 
criminal penalties in civilian communities, but if the individual displaying these behaviors is a 
military personnel, then they become criminal offenses. This distinction is necessary because in 
terms of reviewing previous studies of crime and military communities, the only materials that 
are available are often times sociological studies of these types of deviant behavior that would 
not normally fit the bill for a review of criminological literature. 
The closest that previous studies of military and crime gets to a more traditional 
criminological review of literature is where the military is tied to either the larger society as a 
whole or the life of an individual. This is demonstrated by a few studies. Hoch (1974) 
acknowledged the role that large military bases and university campuses, both of which having 
large populations of young males, would play in skewing any studies on crime in these areas and 
as such, left them out of his study. Hoch (1974) suggested that the large populations of 
disciplined citizens present in large military bases would decrease crime rates in the area due to 
the increased law enforcement capabilities that come along with a military base. Rephann 
(1999:378) found, that while service economic sectors such as amusement and entertainment 
increased crime rates, service sectors such as large military bases actually, “has a large 
depressing effect on crime” in the area.  
Continuing on with an examination of military bases and crime, and including a 
component that is of recent concern, Paloyo, Vance and Vorell (2010) explore the closure of 
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military bases and their connection to rising crime in areas that host them. Paloyo et al. (2010:21-
3) state that, “the personnel who populate the bases are largely comprised of young men—the 
demographic segment most prone to criminal activity—it is conceivable that the closures would 
reduce crime rates. . .” however, “we find no evidence for an association of crime with military 
bases. This conclusion holds over different estimation methods and different scales of analysis.” 
Taken all together, it can be concluded that while military bases may drastically increase the 
demographic most associated with crime (young males), that they also somehow decrease crime 
in the area, and if and when it becomes necessary for these bases to close, the communities that 
hosted them should expect no change, particularly a rise, in crime rates. Rephann (1999) sheds 
light on the how by suggesting that it is the presence of increased law enforcement at both 
prisons and military bases that has a positive effect on the efficacy of local law enforcement 
which carries a deterrent effect on crime in these communities.   
 
Media Attention to Military Sex Scandals and Public Outcry  
 The relationship between the US military and academia, and specifically criminologists, 
becomes relevant because of the current climate; many new media organizations are spreading 
the word on a controversial crime story, the US military has a sexual assault problem. In a 
perfect scenario, the military would not be experiencing sexual assaults, and they most definitely 
would not be experiencing the public backlash that has arisen in response to them. Over the past 
30 years, sporadic military sex scandals have made their way into the public eye via the news 
media and of late, have become a major topic within the military itself. This attention has forced 
the military to attempt to understand why these assaults are happening and attempt to formulate 
an effective strategy for combating them. The following are the more notorious incidents that 
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have grabbed the attention of both the military and the public, and made sexual assaults a major 
focus.  
 Burgess et al. (2013) state that the first attempt by the military to address sexual assault 
came in the wake of the infamous Tailhook incident. Of the more than 4,000 current and retired 
Naval aviators who attended the 35th annual Tailhook convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, 83 
women and 7 men reported being sexually assaulted. This incident led to the resignation of the 
Secritary of the Navy, and the careers of 14 high ranking officers and 200 naval aviators being 
effected. The official Pentagon report on the incident found that this was not an isolated incident 
but rather, just the tip of the iceberg so to speak. From there, the media got ahold of the 1996 
Army Aberdeen Proving Grounds sex assault scandal and the 2003 Air Force Academy sex 
assault scandal. More recent military sexual assault scandals include, but are by no means limited 
to; the West Point rugby team sexual assault scandal, the West Point shower picture/video 
recording scandal, the Naval Academy football team sexual assault scandal, the Ft. Hood SAPR 
team leader being accused of running a prostitution ring and forcing subordinates into 
prostitution, and lastly, the head of the DoAF-SAPR being arrested on sexual battery charges.  
 While it is again a small percentage of the military community engaging in these crimes, 
the media’s attention is constant and has driven it to the forefront of concerns on the part of 
everyday citizens and social science researchers. While these crimes may not be happening every 
day, the media’s coverage would give the average viewer the sense that these crimes are rampant 
and pervasive. As with any crime, media attention leads to viewer outrage, which leads to 
government interest, which leads to a government call to action, which leads to academics 
becoming interested. This is very true of the current situation and how sociologists and 
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criminologists are becoming aware and interested in the military sex assault situation. There 
simply is a lot of outrage, and a huge need for understanding.  
 
The US Military’s Lack of a Public, Reliable, Complete Crime Database 
Mercer and Mercer (2000:9) in their anthology of work concerning all the military 
branches and domestic violence and family abuse observed that, “Because the military is a 
closed system, conducting research has never been easy. Obtaining data can be problematic for 
social scientists.  . .” This could not be a truer statement concerning the experience that social 
scientists interested in the military face in attempting to understand these communities. That 
being said however, some social scientists have been able to conduct studies on military 
communities under various circumstances. Think tanks such as RAND, the Center for Naval 
Analyses, the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, and the Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences have conducted studies and released their 
findings publicly and to the military concerning various specific topics that the military gives 
them permission to research (See for example Caliber and Associate 1996). Occasionally, 
academic researchers are able to gain access to very specific data sources through either FOIA 
requests of non-classified data, or through permission of various branches to collect original data 
on very specific topics (See for example Raiha and Soma 2000.) 
The US military has occasionally over the last 50 plus years established behavior specific 
databases to help them keep records and understand a specific problem (the Army Family 
Advocacy Central Registry for example which houses data on all family crimes including 
domestic violence and child maltreatment.) Another problem is that even within the military 
community itself, behaviors are defined differently which results in conflicting and inaccurate 
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statistics. For example, the US Navy’s SAPRO conceptualizes sexual assault/harassment 
differently than does the DoD; the SAPRO takes more of the social work/psychological approach 
and defines an instance of sexual assault any time an individual feels victimized in a sexual way 
(and as such approaches the problem from more of a victim advocacy view), the DoD by contrast 
accepts a more legal focused conceptualization with specific elements of the encounter required 
in order for it to fit a more strict definition (and thus approaches it from a legal/justice focused 
standpoint) (Garst 2014). This difference in definitions of crimes is problematic to all researchers 
and is something Suris and Lind (2008) acknowledge as a problem/limitation in their study as 
well. This lack of uniformity between the two offices results in different statistics of the same 
concept, sexual assaults, and is problematic for any social scientist attempting to do any type of 
scientific analysis.  
These problematic groupings of data are separate by branch, by problem, and by 
governing group which makes any type of access to them extremely difficult. Case in point, 
Naval Criminal Investigative Services, NCIS, keeps all records on all felony investigations that 
fall within their jurisdiction. These records however, are not in a database, they are stored in 
individual case files. If one was interested in studying homicides within Hampton Roads for 
example, a Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, request would have to be filed. That request 
would then be assigned to an NCIS personnel, who would be tasked with pulling every 
individual homicide case and compiling the individual cases into one mini-homicide database for 
the years requested and containing only the variables requested. That newly created mini-
homicide database then has to go from NCIS back to the FOIA office to approval to be released 
to the researcher who requested it. A researcher interested in studying homicides outside of the 
military community however, would simply pull up the UCR on the FBI’s website, and instantly 
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be able to pull homicide data by year and location, and any other independent variables they 
need. This lack of centralized military crime database presents two problems: One, why would 
any research outside the military community bother with FOIA requests to study crime when 
they can study civilian crime much more easily, and two, how would a researcher within the 
military community tasked with studying a crime topic go about doing it when there is no 
database for them to pull up? 
There appears to have been a solution suggested, DIBRS, the DoD version of NIBRS. In 
fact, according to publicly released DoD documents (Specifically DoD Directive 7730.47, 1996), 
DIBRS does exist and all branches and the DoD are feeding their crime data into it, following the 
exact same format that civilian law enforcement agencies do. DIBRS falls under the jurisdiction 
of Defense Manpower Data Center, DDMC. The question here is, if DIBRS exists, and all DoD 
agencies are feeding their crime data into it, and it is anonymous and compiled in the same 
format as NIBRS, why is it that it is not readily and publicly accessible? Giving all researchers 
access to DIBRS in the same way that NIBRS is accessible, could perhaps encourage the type of 
free range research that is currently going on with other non-military crime topics and would 
perhaps produce a more bountiful crop of research from which the military and DoD could draw 
possible solutions from. Simply put, sexual assaults in the military will not be properly addressed 
by press conferences, closed door discussions, and in-house experiments based on conflicting 
and methodologically unsound data. One uniform, accessible database is the first step towards an 







Part 2: The Current Study 
 
It is the purpose of this project to further contribute to the exploration of the problem of 
sexual assaults within the military community; specifically, within the Navy. It is the goal of the 
paper to provide this further understanding by comparing original NCIS data to previously 
established SAPRO data published in their annual reports, to assess the strength of the 
relationship between sexual assaults and victim/offender characteristics, and to discuss the 
interpretation of the data within the context of previously established literature on sexual 
assaults. The value of this project comes in its original contribution to the field of criminology, 
as well as the fact that it is a study on sexual assaults within the military community conducted 
by a completely unbiased, non-military-affiliated source.  
These goals will be accomplished by first, running distributions and frequencies for the 
data obtained by NCIS; victim and perpetrator demographics need to be assessed. These 
characteristics will then be compared to DoN-SAPRO’s victim and perpetrator demographics to 
address the question of consistency in data recording amongst different sources currently 
examining this problem that was raised by Suris and Lind (2008). The DoN-SAPRO takes more 
victim-advocacy oriented, and DoD/NCIS is more of a justice model approach, so 
understandings the inconsistencies that result is essential. Lastly, simple regression analysis 
models will be ran to assess the strength of the relationships between the dependent variable, 
sexual assaults, and independent variables comprised of the various offender and victim 
characteristics that were discussed in part one.  
While literature currently does exist on this topic, as shown by the previous chapter, a 
major focus right now is still concentrated on exploring the full extent of the problem. As 
demonstrated, no concrete, reliable tallies exist; depending on the source, a different number 
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presents itself. Groves 2013 addresses this inconsistency at length saying that there are a number 
of resources available to sexual assault victims including crisis hotlines, law enforcement, 
emergency medical services, networks of social services, and nonprofit organizations offering 
services including safe housing, crisis counseling, referrals for psychological and medical care, 
programs for building empowerment and self-efficacy, and assistance in navigating the legal and 
justice systems. These nonprofit organizations, the individual branch SAPROs, and the 
individual criminal investigative organizations (NCIS for example) all operationalize sexual 
assault differently leading to vast inconsistencies in categorizing and tallying these crimes. 
 
A Discussion of the Data, Methods  
 
 The original data for this project comes from the Naval Criminal Investigative Services, 
and is the result of a FOIA request placed in early 2013 and fulfilled in late 2013. NCIS has 
jurisdiction in any felony cases involving Navy and Marine personnel and keeps files for all of 
the individual cases they process. These cases are not anonymous, and are not housed in a 
database; they sit in individual case files and are recalled by name or case number when needed. 
When crime data was requested of them, NCIS had to pull all cases individually and enter them 
into an anonymous database file. This file for this project contains sexual assault cases for the 
years 2002, 2007, and 2012. For both offender and victim, the file contains information on age, 
race, rank, and gender. Referring back to chapter one’s discussion on military life and the 
workplace, it is logical to conclude that the independent variable rank, also gives insight into the 
education level and income level of the individual due to the previous discussion of education 
rank, and the DoD’s annual publication of income by rank.  
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 Data from NCIS was selected as a way of measuring sexual assaults in the Navy for a 
few reasons. First, as mentioned by the previous research, many different sources have attempted 
to figure out exactly what the size of the problem is, with different outcomes. NCIS while 
responsible for the Navy, and answering to the Secretary of the Navy, is comprised of civilian 
personnel and this offers an element of impartiality not seen with studies done directly by the 
SAPRO and DoD/DoN offices. Second, data in NCIS had not been previously compiled for this 
type of study. It was not gathered with any particular research question in mind on the part of the 
NCIS intelligence specialist who compiled the cases into one data file, so it is also free of bias. 
Third, because NCIS is not normally the basis for reports released to the media concerning this 
issue, there is no potential bias connected with “spin.” Lastly, NCIS uses a legal code from the 
UCMJ for recording felony actions, so there is no interpretive error with regard as to what 
constitutes an assault; if there is enough to investigate on a formal charge, then it is recorded, just 
like with civilian crime statistics.   
As mentioned above, DoN SAPRO is the office most directly responsible for addressing 
sexual assaults within the Navy and has published a publicly acessable annual report since 2004, 
the first year they started doing so. Unlike NCIS however, they have different goals and 
mandates, and generally take a more victim-advocacy approach. According to Dr. Paul Garst, 
Deputy Director of DoN-SAPRO at the Pentagon, there are three ways that his office triangulates 
sexual assault within the Navy. The first is in the unrestricted reported cases. All reported cases 
of sexual assault come to the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and are classified as either 
restricted or unrestricted. Unrestricted reported cases of sexual assault are those which the victim 
has given permission for names to be used and an official case to be filed with NCIS. With these 
cases, a simple tally can be recorded. Dr. Garst says that roughly 25% of cases remain restricted 
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however so simply going with unrestricted cases fails to paint the whole picture. Because 
restricted cases are anonymous and sealed however, demographic details can’t be obtained or 
analyzed.  
The second way DoN-SAPRO measures sexual assaults is via confidential surveys 
conducted by his office’s website. Navy personnel are emailed and encouraged to log on to a 
website where they can sign in with their username and a common password and answer 
questions about their experience with sexual assaults. These results, while confidential, are not 
anonymous and as Dr. Garst described, possess a potential for bias. The last way, and Dr. Garst 
described as the most difficult, is to conduct qualitative group interviews. Teams from SAPRO 
visit bases and conduct group discussions with various categories of personnel in order to look 
for group concerns and feeling about the progress being made. In general, Dr. Garst said that the 
results from these group interviews point to feelings of it being easier to report sexual assault 
Navy-wide, and that while many feel the problem has not gotten any better, no one has said that 
it is getting worse (Paul Garst, 2014).  
 Utilizing data from NCIS and the annual reports from DoN-SAPRO discussed above, the 
analysis for this project will be conducted in three parts. Part one will consist of running 
frequencies for all of the assault data from NCIS for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012. The goal 
here will be to simply understand what the data has to say in terms of conceptualizing sexual 
assault and the victim and offender characteristics. This sounds elementary, but the value of this 
project again rests in the exploration of the problem. This should return valuable information on 
the victim and offender demographics within the group of unrestricted sexual assault cases from 
the Hampton Roads area for these three years.  
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 Part two of the analysis is a comparison of the offender and victim characteristics 
explored in part one, to the DoN-SAPRO annual reports for the years 2007, and 2012 containing 
information on victim and offender characteristics. There can be no comparison for 2002, 
because DoN-SAPRO was not yet in existence and thus there is no annual report for that year 
(Banning 2014).  This comparison, even with 2002 missing, should still help to address the issue 
of different agencies using different methods to measure the same sexual assault problem. If 
these two different sources, this project and Don-SAPRO are found to be comparable in their 
findings, then it would be reasonable to assume that an accurate measurement of the problem has 
been established.  
Part three consists of binary logistical regression analysis models from the years 2002, 
2007, and 2012 assessing the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable, sexual 
assaults, and the independent victim/offender characteristics variables. Essentially, this project 
hopes to shed light on which offender and victim characteristics are linked to sexual assault 
when compared to other types of assaults. These results should be helpful in further establishing 
the uniqueness of sexual assault within the military community, and also for identifying possible 
focus points for preventative measures. 
 Based on all the previous literature discussed thus far, the following hypothesis about 
victim characteristics could be constructed. In part one of the analysis concerning the frequencies 
of the data from NCIS, a few things could reasonably be expected. First, (citation on crime rates) 
that sexual assault (comprised of both indecent assault and rape for years 2002 and 2007, and 
indecent assault, rape, and adult sexual assault for the year 2012) will be occur more often than 
the other types of assault (simple assault and domestic assault). It will also be expected that the 
victims of sexual assault will be females more often, and at an overwhelmingly disproportionate 
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amount, than males. Continuing on with victim characteristics, it is expected that, as the 
literature in chapter 2 suggests, the victims will be disproportionately younger, and enlisted 
(which will lead to similar conclusions of non-degree holding, and lower income levels than their 
female officer counterparts). For the offenders, it is expected that the offenders will be grossly 
disproportionately male, younger, and also enlisted. The interesting outcome from part one will 
come with seeing exactly where the distribution is with regard to age and rank; younger may not 
necessarily mean youngest and the majority of victims and offenders could be in a middle 
younger age grouping. Likewise with the rank scale, enlisted may not mean lowest enlisted. The 
majority of offenders and victims could possibly fall within a lower, but not necessarily lowest, 
enlisted grouping. It is expected that for both victims and offenders, no discernable or significant 
pattern will be observed with regard to race and sexual assaults.  
 Part two of the analysis is a comparison of the findings in part one utilizing the data from 
NCIS, to the DoN-SAPRO annual sex assault reports from the years 2007 and 2012. For both the 
data from NCIS and the DoN-SAPRO annual sexual assault reports for the years 2007 and 2012, 
there are statistics to compare for the following categories; total assaults, victim gender, age, and 
rank, and offender gender, age, and rank. DoN-SAPRO does not provide race information in 
their annual reports. It is expected that there will be differences between the NCIS and DoN-
SAPRO’s sexual assault statistics due to this phenomenon being observed in the previously 
discussed literature concerning different sources of military crime information. To what degree 
these differences will remain to be seen, but it is reasonable to expect that DoN-SAPRO may 
have higher numbers with regards to total sexual assaults as they have a lass justice-focused 
legally defined standard of recording. If NCIS can only open a case and record it as a sexual 
assault provided there is enough evidence to meet the legal standard of a felony sexual assault, 
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then it is only logical that with that stricter interpretation will come less total assaults recorded. It 
is expected however, that victim and offender age, gender, and rank demographics will behave 
very similarly, nearly the same, in both the NCIS data and the DoN-SAPRO reports.  
 Part three of the analysis consists of a binary logistical regression model where the victim 
and offender characteristics of age, race, gender and rank will be regressed on the different types 
of assault. While the independent variables reflecting victim and offender age, race, rank and 
gender are self-explanatory, the dependent variable, sexual assaults, requires some clarification. 
For each of the three years of data provided by NCIS, all felony offenses were included. These 
offenses included every type of offense possible, but more to the point, every type of assault 
imaginable. For example, included amongst the data sets were assault, aggravated assault, 
indecent assault, domestic assault, sexual assault and adult sexual assault.  The dependent 
variable, sexual assaults, was constructed by combining all offenses that fit the category of 
sexual assault (i.e. indecent assault, sexual assault, rape, adult sexual assault.) A dummy variable 
was then constructed for sexual assaults versus all others. It is this sexual assault dummy variable 
that will be used in the regression model with the aforementioned independent variables.  
The purpose here is to determine which of the independent variable characteristics is 
significantly tied to the sexual assaults and which are not. Several hypotheses can be constructed 
in regard to this regression model. First, it is expected that the younger an individual is, the more 
likely they will be a victim of sexual assault when compared to other forms of assault. Likewise 
for rank. Gender has been discussed at length throughout this project and it is expected that being 
female will be significantly linked to one being a victim of sexual assault when compared to 
other assaults. In terms of offenders, it is expected that the younger the individual, and the lower 
their rank, the stronger the link to possibly committing a sexual assault will be when compared to 
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other types of assault. Again, no link between race and sexual assault one one’s status as either a 
victim or offender is expected.  
 
Conclusion 
 Chapter 1 presented an in depth overview of the military, its structure, and sociocultural 
characteristics relevant to a discussion of sexual assault. Chapter 2 presented a review of all 
relevant sexual assault literature concerning victims, offenders, and total institutions and 
integrated these readings with the military understanding presented in chapter 1. Chapter 3 has 
sought to provide an overview of the relationship between the military, the media and academia 
that has contributed to the inconsistency and difficulty in obtaining data with regard to military 
crime and specifically, military sexual assault. It has also been the purpose of this chapter to 
describe the data and its collection for this project. NCIS and DoN-SAPRO have both been 





ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Part 1: Crosstab Analysis of NCIS Data 
 As was discussed in chapter three, several trends in the crosstabs of the NCIS data was 
expected. To review, the NCIS data is comprised of cases of sexual assault that were reported to 
NCIS, and it was expected that: First, that sexual assault (comprised of both indecent assault and 
rape for years 2002 and 2007, and indecent assault, rape, and adult sexual assault for the year 
2012) will occur more often than the other types of assault (simple assault and domestic assault). 
It will also be expected that the victims of sexual assault will be females more often, and at an 
overwhelmingly disproportionate amount, than males. Continuing on with victim characteristics, 
it is expected that, as the literature in chapter two suggests, the victims will be disproportionately 
younger, and enlisted. For the offenders, it is expected that the offenders will be grossly 
disproportionately male, younger, and also enlisted.  
The interesting outcome from part one will come with seeing exactly where the 
distribution is with regard to age and rank amongst these sexual assault cases; younger may not 
necessarily mean youngest and the majority of victims and offenders could be in a middle 
younger age grouping. Likewise with the rank scale, enlisted victims and offenders may not 
mean lowest enlisted. The majority of offenders and victims could possibly fall within a lower, 
but not necessarily lowest, enlisted grouping. It is expected that for both victims and offenders, 
no discernable or significant pattern will be observed with regard to race and sexual assaults.  
 The crosstabs revealed findings that were, for the most part, expected. With regard to the 
expectation that sexual assault would be the most common type of sexual assault across all three 
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time periods; this was found to not be the case in two of the three time periods. For 2002, of the 
total 160 assaults, 76 were sex assaults and for 2007, 98 of the total 441 assaults were sexual 
assaults. The exception was 2012 when it was reported that 160 of the total 268 assaults were 
sexual assaults. The testing of the relationships between suspect and victim characteristics and 
sexual assault returned a veritable mixed bag of results. For the purpose of this discussion, they 
will be addressed by characteristic, gender, age, race and then rank, with suspects first and then 
victims.  
For 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect gender 
and sexual assault returned significantly strong relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. 
values of .074, .008, and .000 respectively. These values are well below the standard .05 and it 
can therefore be assumed that the relationship between suspect gender and sexual assault across 
all three time periods is strong. As is seen in tables 4.1, males were 88% more likely to be the 
perpetrator of sexual assault in 2002, 91% more likely in 2007, and 79% more likely in 2012. A 
testing of the relationship between victim gender and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 
2012 was found to be less strong than that of the relationship between suspect gender and sexual 
assault, with Fisher’s Exact Test1 Exact Sig. values of .000, .195 (not significant and therefore 
omitted), and .000, respectively. As is seen in table 4.4, females were 87% more likely to be the 








Table 4.1-Offender Crosstab 
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  Male*  Age  Race (W)  Rank* 
2002:  88%    --     --   E4 
2007:  91%    --     51%   E4 
2012:  79%    --     51%   E3 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Chi-Square value <.05 
*Fischer’s Exact Test <.05 
	  
  
For 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect age and 
sexual assault returned somewhat disappointing results with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of 
.060, .245 and .597 respectively. These values are all above the standard .05, so a relationship 
between suspect age and sexual assault cannot be assumed. A testing of the relationship between 
victim age and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 however, was found to be 
extremely strong with a Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. value of .000 for all three time periods. As is 
seen in table 4.2, nineteen was the most common victim age for 2002, and age 24 was the most 
common age for both 2007 and 2012. It is worth noting that age 24 was the second most 
common age for 2002.  
Testing the relationship between suspect race and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007, 
and 2012, returned a mix of strong and weak relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values 
of .594, .000 and .011 respectively. The value for 2002 is above the standard .05 so it could be 
said that for 2002, no relationship between suspect race and sexual assault exists. As is seen in 
table 4.1, for 2007 and 2012 white suspects were the most common accounting for over 51% of 
the total. A testing of the relationship between victim race and sexual assault for the years 2002, 
2007 and 2012 was found to be more in line with the expected result of no significant 
relationship with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .152, .167, and .749 respectively.  
Table 4.2-Victim Crosstab 
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                                                    Victim Characteristics: 
____________________________________________________________________  
  Female* Age  Race (W)  Rank* 
2002:  87%    19     --   E2 
2007:  --    24     --   E2 
2012:  85%    24     --   E2 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Chi-Square value <.05 
*Fischer’s Exact Test <.05 
 
 
Lastly, for 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect 
rank and sexual assault returned significantly strong relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. 
values of .005, .000, and .009 respectively. These values are well below the standard .05 and it 
can therefore be assumed that the relationship between suspect rank and sexual assault across all 
three time periods is strong. As is seen in table 4.1, the most common suspect rank for 2002 and 
2007was E4. E3 was the most common for 2012 (with E4 being second most common.) A 
testing of the relationship between victim rank and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 
2012 was found to be extremely strong with a Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. value of .000 for all three 
time periods. As in seen in table 4.2, the most common victim rank for all three time periods was 
E2.  
 A few summarized points can be made with regard to the tested relationships between 
suspect and victim gender, age, race and rank across the three time periods within the US Navy 
population in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. Gender and rank for both suspects and 
victims demonstrated the strongest relationships across the three time periods. Males were 
consistently more likely to be suspects, and females consistently more likely to be victims. 
Suspects were also likely to hold the rank of E4 and victims were likely to hold the rank of E2 
consistently across the three time periods. The relationship between suspect age and sexual 
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assault was found to be not significant across all three time periods, whereas the relationship 
between victim age and sex assault was found to be strongly significant across all three time 
periods, with 24 being the most common in two of the three time periods (and second most 
common in one time period.) The relationship between suspect race and sex assault was 
significant in two of the three time periods, with white suspects being most common in both time 
periods. The relationship between victim race and sex assault was found to not be significant in 
any of the three time periods.  
 Understanding the strength of the relationships between suspect and victim characteristics 
and sexual assault can be useful in guiding future research in this topic. These understandings 
can also help shape future policy with regard to the allocation of resources and targeted 
education measures. It is suggested that future policy geared towards addressing sexual assault 
within the United States Navy be directed towards the most common suspects (males holding the 
rank of E4 or lower) and most common victims (females, aged 24 and younger who hold the 
rank of E2 and lower.) 
 
Part 2: Comparison to DoN SAPRO Reports 
 Part two of the analysis for this project involves comparing the results from part one, to 
the established published reports from the DoN SAPRO office for the years 2007 and 20122. As 
stated in chapter three, it was expected that there would be differences between the NCIS and 
DoN-SAPRO’s sexual assault statistics due to this phenomenon being observed in the previously 
discussed literature concerning different sources of military crime information. The comparison 
of these two sources of data on sexual assaults is necessary for one overriding reason. Allowing 
one institution to do any and all reporting of statistics on a given type of crime is dangerous from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The DoD did not start compiling sexual assault reports until 2003 so there is no report available for 2002. 
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the perspective of social sciences’ demands of integrity and objectivity as it does not allow for 
criticism, critique and review by its peers. A comparison between the two addresses this need for 
review and exposes any potential problems in the recording and reporting processes.   
Unfortunately, not only is there no report for 2002, but the report posted to DoN SAPRO 
website containing the 2007 report is incomplete. Unlike in 2002 where a report on sexual 
assault simply does not exist, for 2007, the report published on the DoN SAPRO website is not 
specific to Navy sexual assault, but rather is a report on sexual assault throughout the entire US 
Military. In fact it is worth noting that all sexual assault reports published on the DoN SAPRO 
website are for the entire military and not specifically for the Navy. While the report for 2007 
lists enclosures for the individual branches, they have not been included in the report itself 
published online. The report for 2007, addressing sexual assault in the entire United States 
Military is 33 pages long (U.S. Department of Defense 2008). By contrast, the report published 
on the DoN SAPRO website for 2012 also addressing sexual assault for the entire United States 
Military is 729 pages and does actually include the individual branch enclosures (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2013). This increase in reporting of nearly 96% might be indicative of 
the sudden interest military sexual assault commanded in 2012. Unfortunately, the only Navy 
specific reportable information that was contained in the 2007 report consisted of a brief 
synopsis of the Navy’s Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program, and an overall 
count of subjects and victims in both unrestricted and restricted cases. In terms of making a 
comparison to the NCIS data, the information contained within the 2007 report is not particularly 
helpful, as the demographic data it contains pertains only to all sexual assaults military-wide. 
 The 2012 DoN SAPRO report does include some data that is able to be compared to the 
NCIS data, however, it gets extremely confusing. According the report (2012), the Navy 
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enclosure states on what is equal to page 474 of the 729 page document (it is not labeled with an 
actual page number,) that there were a total of 527 unrestricted reports of sexual assault in 2012, 
332 of the cases were completed that same year. This is important to keep in mind as the NCIS 
data is reflective of opened cases, but does not specify if they were closed. The 527 unrestricted 
reports of sexual assault is more comparable to the NCIS data for the purpose of this discussion, 
however the demographics provided by the DoN SAPRO report only apply to closed cases.  
 Immediately, the initial comparison between just these total numbers returns an 
interesting result. If the reports from the DoN SAPRO office are correct, then when compared to 
the NCIS data, it appears that the two sources are reporting somewhat consistently. For 2012, 
according to the NCIS data, 160 total sexual assaults were reported, whereas the DoN’s SAPRO 
report, which represents the entire global presence of the U.S. Navy, showed a total of 527 
unrestricted reports of sex assaults. The interesting part here is that, as previously described in 
chapter one, the Hampton Roads area naval presence, which includes multiple Navy bases 
including main station Norfolk, is the largest U.S. Naval presence in the world.  If the data is 
correct, 160 Hampton Roads area sexual assaults of the total 527 sexual assaults would represent 
roughly 30% of the total sex assaults reported in the entire Navy.  
It is entirely possible that the largest U.S. Naval base on Earth could be responsible for 
30% of all U.S. Navy sexual assaults. Consider it this way, according to the official website of 
the United States Navy (2015), there are 326,046 total active duty U.S. Navy service members, 
of which, according to the Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce (2014), 83,000 are assigned 
to one of the 10 or so Naval bases in the Hampton Roads area. This number represents 25.4% of 
the total Navy. When taken all together, the numbers from both sources are suggesting that 25% 
of the total global US Navy population is responsible for 30% of sexual assaults annually.  
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Where the comparisons between DoN SAPRO reports and NCIS data become a bit more 
differentiated is in the victim and offender demographics themselves. Part one of this chapter 
addresses the strength of the relationship between the individual demographic variables and 
sexual assault within the Hampton Roads area of Virginia’s U.S. Navy population. This 
comparison will focus those aforementioned demographics recorded by NCIS and the 
demographics recorded by the 2012 DoN SAPRO report in order to decipher any possible similar 
patterns.   
With regard to victim characteristics, there were similarities and differences (mainly 
differences) between the 2012 DoN SAPRO reports and the NCIS data. In 2012, DoN SAPRO 
reported 332 completed sexual assault investigations. They reported that those 332 investigations 
contained 356 victims. Of those victims, 76% were white, and 89% were female. For the same 
year, the NCIS data showed that of the 160 sexual assault cases that were investigated, 82 (or 
51.2%) of the victims were white and 148 (or 92.5%) of the victims were female. Further, the 
2012 DoN SAPRO report said that of the 356 victims, the majority, or one third, held the rank of 
E3. The NCIS data showed that the most common ranks that victims held in 2012 was E2 (38 of 
the 160 total cases, or 23.8%) with E3 being the second most common (35 of the 160 total cases, 
or 21.9%.) Lastly, the 2012 DoN SAPRO report showed that of the 356 victims, 65% were 
between the ages of 19 and 24. The NCIS data showed that the most common age of victims was 
24 (25 of the 160 total cases, or 15.6%) with age 23 being the second most common (23 of the 
160 total cases, or 14.4%) and 19 (21 of the total 160 cases, or 13.1%) being the third most 
common. 
Interestingly, as was mentioned above, the Navy population in the Hampton Roads of 
Virginia is the largest Navy presence on Earth and as such, should be a good sample of the Navy 
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as a whole, so it is somewhat strange to have differences that are so large between the 
demographics recorded by NCIS Norfolk, and DoN SAPRO. The female demographic is within 
a few percentage points difference, but a 20 percentage point gap in big Navy’s numbers in 
various categories and Hampton Roads Virginia Navy’s numbers illustrates the need for further 
testing and examination of how these records are compiled. 
With regard to offender characteristics, there were mostly differences between the 2012 
DoN SAPRO reports and the NCIS data. The 2012 DoN SAPRO report shows that of the 332 
completed sexual assault investigations, there were 354 subjects. These subjects were male in 
93% of the cases. The 2012 NCIS data from Norfolk reported that only 81.2% of perpetrators 
were male. Strangely, unlike for victims, no race information about suspects is given by the DoN 
SAPRO report (and no reason for this omission is offered) so a comparison cannot be made here. 
The DoN SAPRO report goes on the say that the majority of suspects (54%) held the rank of E3-
E6. The NCIS data by comparison showed the most common rank that perpetrators held in 2012 
was E3 (26 of the 160 total cases, or 16.2%) with E4 being the second most common (25 of the 
160 total cases, or 15.6%) and E5 being third most common (21 of the total 160 cases, or 
13.1%.) Lastly, with regard to the age of suspect, the 2012 DoN SAPRO report stated that 36% 
of suspects fell between the ages of 19-24. The NCIS data showed that the most common age of 
perpetrators was 25 (22 of the 160 total cases, or 13.8%) with age 22 and 21 being the second 
most common again (20 of the 160 total cases, or 12.5% and, 14 of the total 160 cases, or 8.8% 
respectively.) 
Again here, differences are observed between the DoN SAPRO report and the NCIS data 
for 2012. The two most troubling comparisons however rest in the rank and age demographic 
categories. It is not at all surprising that the majority of perpetrators (54%) would fall between 
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the ranks of E3-E6 when 66.9% of all sailors fall within that category (U.S. Department of 
Defense 2012). The same line of logic could be applied to age, as 66% of all active duty 
personnel are under the age of 30 (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). Making the assumption 
that an entire grouping of a demographic block is behaving consistently without examining the 
individual increments is problematic. For example, if a result indicates that 54% of offenders fall 
between E3 and E6 could possibly lead to the conclusion that offending is greater the lower or 
higher the rank. The same erroneous assumption could be made about age, specifically that 
offending increases as age decreases/increases. As is shown by the individual increments 
displayed within the NCIS data however, these assumptions would be inaccurate.  Breaking up 
the grouping by individual rank and age might be helpful in discerning actual patterns of 
victimization and offending.  
The comparison of the demographics is helpful because, regardless of the possible 
inconsistent recording practices, the demographics are behaving similarly in both sources. This is 
important for two main reasons moving forward. First, these results contribute to what 
criminologists, other social scientists, legislators and policy makers understand about sexual 
assault within the military community. By understanding the demographic patterns, effective 
policies addressing victim and offender characteristics can be designed. Secondly, more accurate 
and appropriate studies can be designed so as to better understand military sexual assault moving 
forward.  
 
Part 3: Regression Analysis of Offender and Victim Demographic Characteristics  
 The third part of this chapter compares suspect and victim characteristics of sexual 
assault and attempts to construct a predictive model concerning the likelihood that an individual 
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will be a suspect or victim of sexual assault. The models all consisted of a dependent dummy 
variable that divided all assaults in the Hampton Roads Virginia are into either “sex assault” (=1) 
or “other assault” (=0.) The independent variables for all three models consisted of age, race, 
gender and rank. With the exception of age, all of the variables were dummy variables; race for 
both suspect and victim was coded as white =1, non-white =0, suspect gender was coded male 
=1, non-male=0, victim gender was coded female =1, non-female =0, and for both suspects and 
victims rank was coded as officer =1, non-officer=0. Three models were ran to correspond with 
the three time periods that have been discussed so far (2002, 2007 and 2012.) The discussion of 
these three models will continue to follow in chronological order. It is generally expected that 
age and gender will be the strongest predictors, race will have no impact, and rank will be 
difficult to interpret due to the disproportionally low presence of officers in both suspect and 
victim categories.  
Binary logistic regression was preformed to assess the impact of various demographic 
characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim of a sexual 
assault within the United States Navy for the year 2002. As was discussed in part one of this 
chapter, there was a total assaults N=160, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 76. The model 
contained six independent variables (df=6), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim race, 
suspect gender and victim gender. The model was statistically significant with a Chi-Square 
score of 53.436, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between sexual 
assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 28.8% and 38.5% of the 





Table 4.3-2002 Regression Model 
2002-Offender and Victim Characteristics 
    B   Exp(B)  
 
Suspect Age   .040   1.041 
Victim Age   -.309   .734** 
Suspect White   -1.883   .152** 
Victim White   2.189   8.928** 
Suspect Male   -.259   .772 
Victim Female  2.189   8.927** 




As shown in the Table 4.3, four of the variables were found to be significant predictors of 
sexual assault when compared to other assaults.  The strongest predictors for sexual assault for 
2002 was victim age, and victim gender. For a one year increase in victim age, the likelihood of 
a sexual assault occurring decreases by (OR=.734.) Females are 8.927 times more likely to be the 
victim of sexual assault. Also significant was the race of the victims. White individuals are .014 
times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault. Lastly, the race of the suspect was also 





Table 4.4-2007 Regression Model 
2007-Offender and Victim Characteristics 
 
    B   Exp(B)  
 
Suspect Age   .352   1.422** 
Victim Age   -.681   .506** 
Suspect White   -1.520   .219 
Victim White   2.085   8.041** 
Suspect Officer  -.510          .601 
Suspect Male   .580   1.786 
Victim Female  -.609   .544 




Binary logistic regression was preformed to assess the impact of various demographic 
characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim of a sexual 
assault within the United States Navy for the year 2007. As was discussed in part one of this 
chapter, there was a total assaults N=441, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 98. The model 
contained seven independent variables (df=7), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim race, 
suspect gender, victim gender and suspect rank. The model was statistically significant with a 
Chi-Square score of 86.932, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between 
sexual assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 21.9% and 34.2% of 
the variance in sexual assault occurrence, and correctly classified 86.4% of the cases. 
As shown in the Table 4.4, again, four of the variables were found to be significant predictors of 
sexual assault when compared to other assaults.  The strongest predictors for sexual assault for 
2007 was again, age. For a one year increase in victim age, the likelihood of a sexual assault 
occurring decreases by (OR=.506.) However, for a one year increase in suspect age, the 
likelihood of a sexual assault occurring increases by (OR=1.422.) Also significant was the 
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variable race. White individuals are 8.041 times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault, 
and white individuals were also .219 times more likely to be the suspect of a sexual assault.  
 
Table 4.5-2012 Regression Model 
2012-Offender and Victim Characteristics 
    B   Exp(B)  
 
Suspect Age   .174   1.190 
Victim Age   -.243   .784 
Suspect White   -1.206   .299 
Victim White   1.604   4.971 
Suspect Officer  17.287         32184996.859 
Victim Officer   .457   1.579 
Suspect Male   -.064   .938 
Victim Female  3.870   47.932** 




Binary logistic regression was also preformed to assess the impact of various 
demographic characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim 
of a sexual assault within the United States Navy for the year 2012. As was discussed in part one 
of this chapter, there was a total assaults N=268, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 160. The 
model contained eight independent variables (df=8), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim 
race, suspect gender, victim gender, suspect rank and victim rank. The model was statistically 
significant with a Chi-Square score of 52.082, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to 
distinguish between sexual assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 
32.6% and 59.4% of the variance in sexual assault occurrence, and correctly classified 92.4% of 
the cases. As shown in the Table 4.5, unfortunately, only one of the variables was found to be a 
significant predictor of sexual assault when compared to other assaults.  The strongest predictor 
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of sexual assault for 2012 was victim gender. Females are 47.932 times more likely to be the 
victim of sexual assault in 2012. 
While not all the independent variables were found to be significant predictors of sexual 
assault when compared to other assaults within the US Navy, there were a few major takeaways. 
First, age was found to be a significant predictor in both 2002 and 2007. Consistently between 
the two time periods, victim age was found to be a strong predictor, demonstrating that younger 
sailors have a higher likelihood of being the victim of sexual assault. In a surprising turn, race 
was found to also be a significant predictor. In both 2002 and 2007, white individuals were more 
likely to be the victim and suspect of sexual assault. Lastly, victim gender was also found to be 
significant in 2002 and 2012, with females being much more likely to be the victim of sexual 






POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation is an examination of the sexual assault issue within the United States 
Navy. Chapter one discussed the structure and organization of the military as well as military 
sociological and criminological literature that contributes to an understanding of crime within the 
military. Chapter two took it a step further and addressed the crime of sexual assault specifically 
and in the context of the military community and similarly situated communities. Chapter three 
explained the data that would be used and analysis that would occur. The results from chapter 
four were interesting and relevant to a discussion of policy implications and future research 
moving forward in the future with this topic.  
 While most criminological dissertations focus of a specific contribution to the field 
utilizing a sophisticated statistical analysis, this dissertation is different in the sense that while 
the quantitative analysis is valuable, the contribution to the field’s understanding of military 
sexual assault via the collection of relevant literature and construction of ideas about it is just as 
valuable. As such, implications of this dissertation can generally be broken in to two categories; 
implications from the examination and analysis of both the NCIS and DoD data, and 
implications from the collected literature relevant to sexual assault in the Navy specifically and 
the US Military as a whole.  
 
Implications Stemming from the Analysis 
 With regard to the implications stemming from the findings from the data, the most 
important and overwhelming message is clear; the collection, classification and housing of 
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military crime data, and military sexual assault data specifically, must be improved.  While no 
crime database is perfect, a logical starting point would be to model a military crime database 
after the civilian Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and put to work the 50+ years of research that 
has been done on the UCR and housing of civilian crime data to construct and maintain a 
military crime database. Simply put, any agency tasked with investigating a crime involving 
military personnel needs to submit information about that investigation to the central military 
crime database. Utilizing the same recording practices and information gathering techniques that 
civilian police departments utilize would make implementing this process in the military 
relatively easy. A few adjustments accounting for military specific details could be made to the 
reporting forms. It is recommended that either the Defense Data Manpower Center or a newly 
DoD sanction and created crime specialty data management office be tasked with housing and 
managing this database. This office and its criminologist employees should be tasked with 
writing any and all reports concerning crime within the military, and not the DoD SAPRO 
employees.  
 The importance of reliable data in addressing crime cannot be understated, and recently, a 
growing number of politicians are also calling for a reliable and accurate measurement. United 
States Senator Kristen Gillibrand (D-NY) appears to be leading the charge. In May of this year 
(2015) many news organizations got a hold of a report she released where she accused the DoD 
of not providing her with complete and accurate information about military sexual assault at 
many bases throughout the nation. She went on further to state that of the 107 cases she 
examined, less than a quarter went to trial, and of those, 11 obtained convictions (Office of U.S. 
Senator Kristen Gillibrand 2015).   
101 
	  
 While modeling a military crime database after a civilian crime database is the 
suggestion, civilian oversight in military legal/criminal matters is not. Legal matters within the 
military community need to be handled by the JAG corps and independent objective commands. 
They are really the only ones in a position to both objectively investigate and prosecute sexual 
assaults. This satisfies the need to remove the case proceedings from direct command and also 
the requests to utilize an outside party to investigate and prosecute.  
 The second most important take away from the analysis of the NCIS and DoD data rests 
in the possible inconsistencies with regard to the recording of the total sexual assault cases 
themselves. As was discussed in Chapter 3, there was some disagreement within the DoN 
SAPRO with regard to the legal definition or the clinical (counseling) definition of sexual 
assault. There needs to be a military-wide accepted definition of what constitutes a sexual assault 
and what does not. Having different definitions by branch and by recording agency make for a 
situation where inaccurate and inconsistent data is collected, making any type of meaningful 
analysis nearly impossible. Currently, the DoD has a reasonable definition of sexual assault,  
Intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or 
abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. The term 
includes a broad category of sexual offenses consisting of the following specific 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offenses: rape, sexual assault, 
aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, nonconsensual sodomy (forced 
oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these acts. 
 
It is essential that going forward, if this is the definition, then all branches must adhere to this 
definition with regard to recording practices. While it is a noble idea that unwanted and harassing 
speech must not be tolerated, treating speech or other non-physical  acts as sexual assaults and 
recording them as such is problematic and would need to be avoided. 
 Lastly, with regard to the data itself, even when accounting for the inconsistencies and 
differences between the NCIS and DoD sources, it appears that some victim and offender 
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demographics hold true. These demographics have a strong literature foundation (see chapters 1, 
2 and 3,) so the results that were found in the analysis portion of this project were not surprising. 
These demographic trends need to be the foundation of future policies constructed to address the 
problem of sexual assault. Victim policies and education needs to be structured in such a way 
that understands that females between the ages of 19 and 24, holding the rank of E2-E4 are most 
often the victims of sexual assault, and that offenders holding the rank of E4 are most often the 
perpetrators.  
 





Furthermore, the current sentiment of only addressing victim behavior and not perpetrator 
behavior is unacceptable. Table 5.1 is a picture of a flyer posted to a women’s bathroom at 
Wright-Patterson AFB. While the overall idea of educating women about what they could 
possibly do to avoid being a suitable target of sexual assault, and informing them of the helpful 
resources available to them should they become a victim of sexual assault is a good thing, it 
raises the question of what is or is not posted in the men’s restroom next door, and also, 
reinforces the cultural myth that victims are somehow responsible for their victimization. It is 
suggested that balance is grossly missing from the sexual assault education movement within the 
military. Posting warnings only in the restroom of the gender that is most likely to be victimized 
while ignoring the gender that is most likely to perpetrate is absurd. A reasonable suggestion for 
illustrating this point on a flyer that is most likely missing from the men’s restroom would be the 
following: 
ATTENTION: Sexual assault is a crime and is not tolerated in the United States 
Military. If accused, your career could potentially be in jeopardy. If convicted you 
will serve jail time. The following are all helpful tips for avoiding being a 
perpetrator of sexual assault: Pay attention to your surroundings and take note of 
predatory behavior within your party. Do not allow members of your party to be 
unwillingly secluded. Socialize with people who share your same values. Do not 
serve anyone more alcohol when they are already intoxicated. Do not drug 
anyone. Do not physically harm anyone in order to have sex with them. Do not 
force an individual to have sex via the use of intimidation or a gang of people. 
Should you see any of these behaviors, report them appropriately. Failure to do so 
makes you an accessory and you will serve jail time. Preventing sexual assault is 
everyone’s duty. 
 
Lastly, the results from the regression models themselves are valuable in terms of a better 
understanding of the demographics of sexual assault victims and offenders and possible policy 
implications. While no one variable was consistently significant over the three time periods, a 
few were significant in at least two of the time periods and are worthy of discussion. In 2002 and 
2007 age was a significant predictor of victimization, with younger women being more likely to 
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be victimized. For 2007, suspect age was a significant predictor suggesting that the older a male 
gets, the more likely he is to offend. The take away from the age variables is that traditional 
military sexual assault education, which has been geared at both genders under the age of 30 
perhaps needs to be redirected and altered for the suspect’s age. While it appears that education 
geared to victims is hitting an appropriate audience, it could be suggested that new education 
needs to be developed and tailored specifically towards the 25-40 crowd. This education could 
perhaps include addressing the “old school” mentality towards women in the military, as well as 
what used to be, but no longer is acceptable workplace behavior.  
Gender was another significant predictor, however it was only significant for victims. 
Females have overwhelmingly higher odds of being the victim of sexual assault than their male 
counterparts. While this may seem obvious to some of those tasked with developing curriculum 
for military sexual assault education programs, simply informing women of their higher risk of 
victimization is not sufficient. It is suggested that those tasked with constructing these programs 
delve into the available literature concerning gender construction, workplace gender power 
dynamics, violence against women and sexual harassment and incorporate these readings into the 
curriculum. Informing military personnel that women are more likely to be victims of sexual 
assault is helpful, but providing context and explaining why it is the case and what elements of 
society have contributed to this situation allows for an individual to start questioning their 
environment and beliefs and then allows them to entertain the notion of change.  
The most surprising result, by far, from the regression models was that race was a 
significant predictor of both victim and offender status for two of the three models. Generally 
speaking, in criminology, race is never a significant predictor. This very surprising result 
indicates that both those individual who identify as white are more likely to be both victims and 
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offenders of sexual assault in the US Navy. While gender equality has always been a problem in 
the US military, racial equality issues have been greatly improving since around the time of the 
Vietnam War. In today’s military, many of the systemic racial inequalities experienced in the 
civilian world are lessened. It is possible however that the regression model results are the result 
of a couple possibilities, first, simple numbers game where minorities still make up the minority 
of the military population, and two, reporting trends.  
It is possible that there could be racial reporting trends that are rooted in cultural and 
civilian experiences that have accompanied individual military personnel into the military. Some 
literature has suggested that African American women have historically been perceived as 
sexually promiscuous and therefore sexual crimes against them are less offensive (Collins 1985; 
Neville and Pugh 1997). If this concept was playing out in the US military, then it would be 
expected that black women would have a higher chance of being victimized and the results don’t 
indicate that. It could be assumed then that the reporting practice trends might be responsible. 
Neville and Pugh 1997 suggest that, culturally specific attitudes towards the police might explain 
African American women’s’ unwillingness to report sexual assaults, specifically that a general 
distrust of the police and that a belief that the police would not take the claims seriously is to 
blame. Translated from civilian to military implications, it is suggested that sexual assault 
education within the US military include a very clear reporting procedure and a continued 
assurance that claims will be received, investigated fully, and victims will not need to fear 






Implications Stemming from Other DoD Report-Based Information  
Two interesting points of information contained within the DoD’s report on sexual 
assault from 2012 are relevant to this discussion on policy and future research implications: First 
is the data concerning how NCIS was notified by of the unrestricted cases of sexual assault, and 
second, the amount of cases that were unable to be substantiated. The issue of how NCIS is 
notified of cases is best illustrated with the graph provided by the DoD’s 2012 report on sexual 
assault (see table 5.2.) 
 
Figure 5.2-NCIS Notification 
 
 
As the table 5.2 shows, 40% of the cases are being reported to NCIS by individual 
commands, and only 21% from the victims themselves. Chapters 1 and 2 illustrated all the 
potential reasons why having a victim of sexual assault in the military go through their command 
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in order to receive help or to pursue charges. Ideally, moving forward, this number needs to 
decrease. This could be achieved in two ways: First, an independent investigative resource needs 
to be in place. This could be achieved by continuing to rely on NCIS, but also by allocating more 
responsibility to investigate these crimes to the JAG corps. They are really the only ones in a 
position to both objectively investigate and prosecute sexual assaults. This would also satisfy the 
need to remove the case proceedings from direct command and also the requests to utilize an 
outside party to investigate and prosecute.  Second, more education needs to be enacted geared 
towards letting military personnel know that their first option in reporting a sexual assault is not 
their command.  
Another problem revealed by the reports is the issue of reported cases of sexual assault 
and the amount of those cases that can actually be substantiated (found to be legitimate cases of 
sexual assault and not processed out in some other way). In the entire military-wide DoD report 
on sexual assault from 2012, there were a total of 1320 sexual assault victims involved in cases 
that were investigated. Of those, only 817 were substantiated. The suspects for the same year 
show a similar result; of the 1406 alleged suspects, cases against only 749 were able to be 
substantiated. This finding leads to two very relevant questions, what happened with the nearly 
half of all the cases that couldn’t be substantiated? And also, what can be done to address this 
gap?  
One unfortunate aspect to the question of the unsubstantiated cases is the issue of false 
claims of sexual assault. A surprising suggestion to help address this number might be to 
decriminalize consensual sexual acts between members of the military. On its face, anti-
fraternization rules make a lot of sense; they help prevent emotional issues in the workplace and 
also help prevent favoritism. But these rules fail to take into account two major indisputable 
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unmalleable fact; first, consensual sex is a normal function of any adult population regardless of 
any conditions of that adult population including isolation, occupation, religion, stress, ect. . . 
and second, the criminalization of consensual sex inherently requires more than one person. This 
inherent joint-culpability creates a possible power situation for one of the involved parties. When 
two or more individuals are found to have engaged in a sexual encounter, their career is 
immediately in jeopardy. As such, facing severe damage to one’s career as well as the loss of 
years’ worth of effort, the self-preserving move (particularly if the individual is female and a 
fraternization conviction would become public knowledge to any and all colleagues, carrying 
with it all of the usual gendered sexual stigmatization) might be to claim that the encounter was 
non-consensual.  
The acknowledgement that some of the sexual assault claims as not legitimate is not a 
comfortable line of thinking for any policy maker to really go down, but just as we must give 
every victim the care, dignity and respect that they deserve, we must also acknowledge that the 
current system is absolutely conducive to creating a power situation in which victimization can 
be falsely claimed to protect against punitive sanctions. According to the reports, a nearly 50% 
gap in reported sexual assaults and those that could be substantiated demands that, if false claims 
are being made, the question of why must be examined and address. If the goal of anti-
fraternization rules (as well as adultery rules) is to prevent emotional tangles, distraction and 
favoritism in the workplace, then simply identify and severely punish those behaviors should 
they arise. Treating our military personnel as adults who are capable of making decisions as well 
as simplifying the rules in this regard could possibly decrease the amount of potential false 
claims that exist. With the decrease of false claims comes the increase in attention and credibility 
afforded to legitimate claims of sexual assault. As consensual sex within the military community 
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is decriminalized, the attention paid to individual sexual assault investigations, the resources 
allocated for said investigations, and the consequences rendered to one who is found to have 
committed a sexual assault all must increase.  
Lastly, the issue of actual sexual assaults and reported sexual assaults needs to be 
addressed and clarified in both official reports and media reports. Often times, media reports rely 
on official reports, but many times, the confusion is so great that the full picture becomes very 
distorted. In 2013, all of the major news organizations ran with the story that for 2012, there 
were 26,000 reports of sexual assault military wide. Many of them cited a “pentagon study.” At 
the same time, the DoD released their sexual assault report for 2012 and as discussed previously, 
stated that a total 3,374 occurred. This is obviously a huge discrepancy. The 26,000 number 
comes from an anonymous self-report survey conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
the concerned workplace environment. The DoD’s report is comprised of all sexual assault cases 
actually reported and investigated. The DMDC’s workplace environment study is relevant 
because much like self-report surveys used by criminologists, this is really the only way to 
uncover the “dark figure of crime” associated with this particular offense within the military. In 
terms of a number of “actual” sexual assaults that take place, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the number falls somewhere in between the two numbers. Without clearer definitions of 
what exactly constitutes sexual assault, and better reporting practices, the actual number may 
never be uncovered.  
 
Implications Stemming From the Literature  
 A series of themes appear in the literature relevant to military sexual assault; historical 
military workplace culture, combat hypermasculinity. Addressing these themes are central to 
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making adjustments to the cultural elements within the military workplace that are perhaps 
contributing to sexual assaults. As was discussed in chapter 1, the military has a historical 
conscious of being men only. This cultural element needs to be done away with, essentially, the 
military needs to cast off the idea of cultural nostalgia, “the good old days” when women weren’t 
allowed. Those days were a mistake, and the cultural remnants of those days are embarrassing to 
our military. Sentiments expressed towards those days need to not be tolerated. Brownson 
(2015:771) also suggests promoting understanding, adaptation and acceptance the terms 
equivalent and equal in the workplace, 
Not simply a matter of semantics, utilization of the word ‘‘equivalent’’ as 
opposed to ‘‘equal’’ is critical in this discussion and in understanding the 
distinction between the physicality, skills, and behaviors both males and females 
bring to their Marine Corps experience. Although females may not be physically 
equal to their male peers in terms of strength and endurance, they certainly 
possess the potential to exhibit equivalency with the males. 
 
To further combat hypermasculinity, Morris (1996) suggests integrating more and more 
women into military roles, particularly combat roles. Suggests replacing a culture of 
hypermasculinity with one of “ungendered professionalism” as the bond that holds these units 
together. Again, a noble idea, but as was demonstrated in chapter 1, the inherent culture of much 
of the combat groups, particularly the special warfare and special forces communities, revolves 
around hypermasculinity and forcing these groups to integrate is a recipe for disaster. Barrett’s 
(1996) findings on hypermasculinity differences by job within the Navy point towards a job 
specific approach in combating sexual assaults within the military but specifically within the 
Navy and essentially suggest fully integrated non-combat roles and fully segregated combat 
roles.  
This idea is not unprecedented. It his however uncomfortable and extremely un-
politically correct. In a nation where the Supreme Court has declared separate is very much not 
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equal with regard to Constitutional, it becomes difficult to even entertain the idea that separate 
might be a good idea in the armed forces.  There are those in the special warfare community who 
believe that women are just as capable as men but believe that mixing the two would be 
disastrous, even catastrophic. The main argument against integration is simply the physical 
differences between men and women. Entertain the above quote above by Brownson (2015) in 
conjunction with the following example. A 6’2’’, 220 pound Navy SEAL, fully kitted up with 
nearly 100 additional pounds of gear who finds himself injured in a combat situation could not 
possibly be dragged to safety by a female Navy SEAL (as women have been cleared to attend 
BUDS as this dissertation goes to print) standing roughly 5’8,” weighing 145lbs with nearly 100 
lbs of additional gear on herself. Even if she is the strongest woman on earth, she can’t drag 300 
pounds to safety. A smaller male SEAL would have difficulty doing it. The other major 
argument against integration of combat groups is what was illustrated in chapter 1, and that is, 
that a woman amongst these men would not be treated as an equal, but rather as a piece of meat.      
So what is the solution here? Unfortunately, one of America’s most embarrassing 
mistakes might hold the key to addressing separate combat roles; the treatment of African 
Americans during WWII, specifically the case of the Tuskegee Airmen. Women who want to 
serve their nation in combat roles, and specifically within the special forces and special warfare 
communities, need to do so separately.  It is an indisputable fact that the treatment of African 
American service members during WWII was unacceptable and embarrassing. The reasons they 
were segregated were arbitrary, not thought out, and downright illogical. But the one small 
beacon of light in the entire sham was that when pushed down and segregated, the Tuskegee 
Airmen, a squadron of all black pilots, not only preformed, but exceeded the performance of 
their white colleagues and eventually accepted these pilots as their equals. The same needs to be 
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done with women entering the special warfare and special forces communities. Let these women 
stand on their own and prove themselves as equals and they will be accepted as equals, or the 
equivalent, of their male colleagues. This equality will carry with it, an intolerance of sexual 
assault within these communities, effectively stopping a sexual assault issue before there really is 
one.  
Highlight the differences where they do exist and capitalize on them. The impact of 
integrating women into the military is not a myth or untested idea; it has been tested repeatedly 
with consistent results demonstrating a definite effect. As previously stated, Savage and Gabriel 
(1976) mentioned the tie between integrating women and decreased unit cohesion and, “recent 
evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, the increased presence of women in U.S. 
Army companies is indeed associated with decreased cohesion, but no specific reasons for this 
have been established” (Rosen et al. 1999, Rosen et al. 2003:325-6). Further, from a measurable 
standpoint, the hypermasculinity and group cohesion are definitely effected by integrating 
women.  
Group hypermasculinity was significantly positively associated at the group level 
with both vertical and horizontal cohesion in male-only units. However, the 
relationship between these variables in mixed gender units was negative. Thus, 
the presence of women in military units does not simple decrease the levels of 
group hypermasculinity, but changes the relationship of group hypermasculinity 
to cohesion. With women present in the unit, hypermasculinity is no longer 
related to positive outcomes, and may even be related to negative outcomes. 
(Rosen et al. 2003:344) 
 
 Lastly, in combating sexual assault from the military workplace cultural standpoint, 
certain myths about sexual assault need to be identified as myths and eradicated. Castro et al. 




Only women are assaulted. People who commit sexual assaults are of certain 
backgrounds. People who offend are evil and appear different than others. Sexual 
assault is less of a problem these days.  If she was raped, why is she talking to him 
the next day? She would have resisted if she didn’t want to have sex. He couldn’t 
help himself. She shouldn’t have been drinking. She had sex with him before.  
 
 All of these myths are problematic to the overall efforts to combat sexual assault because 
they make assumptions about the blameworthiness of the victim in the crime that was committed 
against them. As was seen above with the image of the flyer posted in the women’s restroom on 
an Air Force base, victim blaming is so perverse in the military culture that it even dictates the 
attempts made to prevent sexual assault. Going forward, SAPRO education needs to be less 
centered around victim behavior and more centered around conveying the clear message to 
potential offenders that sexual assault is 100% not tolerated in the United States Military.  
 
Limitations 
 As with any study, a few limitations do exist. The issue of the data itself is problematic. 
As was discussed in chapter 3, the data from NCIS was obtained via FOIA request and because 
of the nature of the data, this non-NCIS personnel researcher was not allowed to have access to 
the cases from which the data files were constructed. While it is assumed that Mr. Poche worked 
with the highest level of diligence and thoroughness, human error is entirely possible. Flaws with 
the data file construction are possible and at this point relatively unknown. It has also come to 
the attention of this researcher that after the data from NCIS was handed over for examination, a 
new electronic system was put in place to manage NCIS’ cases. If Mr. Poche were to compile a 
data file today, it would possibly be easier and more efficient. While the data itself didn’t change 
in that time period, the means of assembling it did, and in this way, there is potential for change. 
114 
	  
 Also, the data that was obtained from NCIS only contained the independent variables 
age, race, rank and gender. That was greatly limiting in this current study which focuses strongly 
on the impact of workplace culture and structure in understanding military sexual assault. A 
future strategy that examines cultural elements and community sentiments would be extremely 
helpful.  
 Lastly, the research was greatly hindered by the DoD’s SAPRO reports themselves. The 
reports are written in such a way that is greatly confusing to anyone attempting to understand the 
data within. Items are labeled unclearly in places. Tables are structured in very confusing ways. 
Attempting to do any type of outer-agency comparison or analysis is extremely difficult. While 
the researcher is fairly certain that the comparative analysis contained within the dissertation is 
correct based on how the reports were labeled, there does exist the possibility of error concerning 
the information contained within the reports themselves that the researcher has no way of 







The problem of sexual assault in the military is unacceptable. The prolonged inadequacy 
and inefficiency in addressing the problem and the subsequent cover-ups is embarrassing on a 
global scale. It must stop. 
As this goes to print, several cases continue to appear in the media of sexual assaults 
within the military community, and subsequent intimation and cover-ups. (List lots of them all 
and brief details.) While there is much discussion amongst the leadership and legislative and 
executive branches, there is a gross failure to act in any significant way.   
Implementation of these changes will be extremely difficult. But it is entirely possible. It 
may be time to acknowledge the culture of military leadership and how this contributes to an 
unwillingness to address and act in an effective way. Enacting any type of action moving 
forward forces an admittance of failure and as a result, a head will roll somewhere for it. While 
dealing with this problem, we need to consider harsh punishments for those who knowingly 
covered up these crimes and allowed for them to occur, but also forgiveness and understanding 
for those who were following established policies in good faith.  
Crime is a normal function of any given society. Sexual assault, unfortunately, is going to occur 
in any given society. The idea of eradication is, while noble in its notion, naive and out of touch. 
Many societies have tried many different approaches, both peaceful and extremely punitive, to 
deter any number of crimes and have failed miserably. The first and immediate step that must be 
taken is an acceptance of the idea that these horrific crimes are going to happen. Make no 
mistake, this is not an acceptance of the crimes themselves! This is an acceptance of the notion 
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that the crime will occur, and with this acknowledgement and acceptance comes vigilance. The 
military must be vigilant and on guard against these crimes at all times, with no exception so that 
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